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Summary  findinigs
The slowdown and possible reversal in the rural-to-urban  employment has fallen. The growing labor force, which
flow of labor in Ghana is symptomatic of a basic  agriculture could not absorb productively, has spilled
shortcoming in the country's economic recovery: the  over into service activities and the informal sector.
inadequate growth  of the productive sector in the  Ghana's large informal sector is symptomatic of an
nonagricultural economy. The rate of growth of GDP  economy with low growth  potential.
has been adequate but much of the growth has been  In the medium term, the surest way to absorb labor
fueled and led by the services sector, which (at more than  would be to increase investment in the agriculture sector.
46 percent) has surpassed agriculture as the main  And the only way to increase investment in that sector is
contributor  to GDP.  to change the composition in public spending. As long as
In some way growth  in the services sector has been  the public sector wage bill remains a sizable parr of
positive, but arguably it is a once-for-all adjustment to  government expenditure, an increase in wage levels not
recover that cannot be sustained at this growth  rate  compensated by reduction in employment will create
without commensurate growth in both agricultural and  strains in the budgetary balance and will defeat the most
nonagricultural production.  important instrument of increasing the growth rate of
Evidently, stabilizatiion  and liberalization measures  employment - higher levels of public investment in
have not been sufficient to put the industrial sector on a  agriculture.
path of sustained growth. There  is too little skilled labor  It is possible that a vicious circle is complete. Higher
in Ghana, and demand for industrial goods has been  wages in the public sector might be necessary to increase
weak, in part because the cost of credit is high and  efficiency, without which productive public investment is
savings are too low for inefficient, state-run enterprises  not possible. But if the government is not willing or able
to buy the equipment they need.  to reduce public employment, and is further unable to
Returns to higher (especially university) education are  alter the composition of expenditure to provide more
high in Ghana, largely because of high wages for  finance for agriculture-related public investment, a high
government services. Because of inadequate technical  wage public policy will merely fuel inflationary pressures
and vocational education, returns to secondary education  reducing the real investment ratio even further. The only
are low.  way out of this vicious circle, if it exists, is a larger
Employment trends have mirrored the deficiency in  infusion of foreign and private investment than has been
output growth. Every year since 1987, industrial  seen so far, supplemented by corrective monetary policy.
This paper - a product of the Human Development Technical Family, Africa Region - is a background paper for World
Bank Economic Sector Work on Ghana:  LaborMarkets and Poverty. Copies of this paper are available free from the World
Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Betty Casely-Hayford, roomJ8-272,  telephone 202-473-
4672,  fax 202-473-8065,  Internet address bcasely-hayford@worldbank.org. November 1997. (65 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work  in progress  to  encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they rep0resent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterEmployment, Labor Markets and Poverty in Ghana:
A Study of Changes During Economic Decline and Recovery.
Sudharshan  Canagarajah
Dipak Mazumdar
This paper is one of a series of background  papers undertaken  as part of a World Bank Economic  and
Sector Work (ESW)  on Ghana:  Labor Markets  and Poverty.  We acknowledge  funding from Dutch and
Canadian  Trust Funds.TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY  1
1.  Structure of Labor Markets in Ghana  2-5
1.1  Introduction  2
1.2  Multiple Occupations  2-4
1.3  The Impact of Government Policies on the Labor Market  4-5
2.  Economic Policies and Basic Trends in the Economy
5-7
2.1  Pre-1983  5-6
2.2  The Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and After  6-7
2.3  Recent Shocks  7
3.  The Formal Sector  8-19
3.1  The Pre-ERP Period  8-9
3.1.1  Employment  8-9
3.1.2  Wages  9
3.2  Post-ERP Developments  10
3.2.1  The Public Sector  10
3.2.2  The Private Sector  10
3.3  Evaluation  11-19
3.3.1  Is the Size of Employment in the Public Sector too Large?  11-12
3.3.2  Are Public Sector Wages too High?  12-18
3.3.3  The Distribution of Earnings  18-19
4.  Firm Size and Wage Levels in Ghana's Manufacturing Sector  20-28
4.1  Analysis by Teal  20
4.2  Analysis by Mazumdar  21-23
4.3  Causes of the Increase in Earnings with Firm Size  23-24
4.4  Inelastic Supply of Labor  24-25
4.5  Efficiency Wage  25-26
4.6  Increasing Returns to Scale and Profit Sharing  26-274.7  Informal  Sector  Activities  in Ghana  27-28
5.  Education  and Earnings  29-36
5.1  Public and Private  Sectors  31-32
5.2  Quality  of Education  32-33
5.3  Family  Background,  Private-Public  Choice  and  33-34
Returns  to Education
5.4  Trends  in Child Labor  and Schooling  in Ghana  34-36
6.  Rural-Urban  Earnings  Difference  36-49
6.1  The Pre-Crisis  Economy  36-37
6.2  The Course  of Rural-Urban  Earnings  Differences  during  the  3840
Economic  Decline
6.3  The Rural-Urban  Difference  after  the Recovery  40-44
6.4  Factors Affecting  Rural-Urban  Differences  in Trends in  4449
Income  and Poverty
6.4.1  The Absorption  of Labor  45-46
6.4.2  The Formal-Informal  Earnings  Difference  in Urban  Ghana 46
6.4.3  Income  Growth  and Poverty  Reduction  in the Rural  46-47
Economy
6.4.4  Absolute  Levels  of Poverty  in the Rural and Urban  47-49
Sectors  and Labor  Migration
7.  Conclusions  and Recommendations  49-53
7.1  The Future  of Labor  Absorption  in Ghana  49-53
7.2  An Agenda  for Future Research  53
REFERENCES  54-55
Appendix  1  57-61
Appendix  2  62-65SUMMARY
This paper uses a variety of sources from the current literature  to review some of the more
salient features of labor markets and employment in Ghana during economic decline and
changes  before  and after the Economic  Reform  Program. We begin  in Section 1 with an outline
of the basic structure of labor markets in Ghana, identifying  the critical segments,  and the
interrelationships  between  them. We discuss  inter alia the aspects  of government  policy which
specifically  impinge on theses segments. It is argued that in Ghana, as in most developing
countries,  the narrow  view of labor market policy is inappropriate,  since it focuses  specifically
on the formal sector  which is a small part of the labor market. A more helpful view of labor
market issues is obtained by including the self-employed,  the wage earners in the informal
sector  as well as the formal  wage employees  in the scope of the discussion. However,  the data
on earnings and employment in the formal sector tend to be more comprehensive  in these
economies,  and in any case the formal  sector is a large  part of the monetary  or non-subsistence
economy. Thus, after a brief review in Section  2 of the essential aspects of Ghana's macro-
economic  evolution and policies in recent years, the discussion  turns to the formal sector in
Section  3.  It focuses on the employment  and wage implications  of the phenomena  decline  and
partial recovery of the Ghanaian economy, and pays particular importance to the relative
performance  of the private and the public sectors and to the changes  in the differential  in wage
levels  between  them. We turn in Section  4 to the topic of the difference  in wages between  small
and large firms within  the manufacturing  sector  of Ghana. It is interesting  to see that, even  after
a prolonged  period of wage decline, which might be expected  to lead to a squeezing  of wage
differentials  of all kinds, the scale related wage differential continues to be as important in
Ghana as in other developing  countries. Some detailed  data exist for the manufacturing  sector
in Ghana due to special enterprise surveys  conducted  by the Research Program of Enterprise
Development  (RPED)  sponsored  by the World  Bank. These surveys,  three waves spanning  the
years from 1991  to 1994 in a number  of African  countries,  obtained data from enterprises  and
their employees  covering  the entire spectrum  of sizes, ranging  from micro to large firms. This
material is especially useful for studying the wage structure in the manufacturing  sector in
Ghana in a comparative  context. A brief review  of the structure  of the informal  sector  activities,
undoubtedly  the largest  sector of employment  activity of the poor, is given to complement  the
more  comprehensive  formal  sector employment.  In the following  Section 5 we utilize  the three
waves  of data collected  from a sample survey  of households  over the years 1987-91  (called  the
Ghana Living  Standard  Survey--  GLSS) to study  another important  aspect of the labor market--
the relationship  between education  and earnings. Lastly, in Section 6  we turn to the larger
issues  of differences  in the levels  and distribution  of earnings  in the rural and the urban sectors
of Ghana, and the related issues of labor market behavior and poverty. The treatment here is
historical  as we are interested  in following  the trends over time as they have evolved  with the
macro-economic  development  of Ghana. Section  7 concludes  with the general findings of this
paper and suggestions  for further analysis to supplement the results reported in this paper;
particularly we highlight gaps which could be filled through further analysis of the Ghana
Living Standard  Survey (GLSS) data sets. The appendices  deal with role of labor in Ghana's
economic growth using growth accounting  and project poverty in Ghana up to 2000 using
various  growth  projections  based  on Ghana CAS  for 1997.1.  Structure of Labor Markets in Ghana
1.1.  Introduction
It is customary to define labor markets in developing countries, first in terms of
rural and urban locations, and secondly, to distinguish the formal and informal sectors
within each.  The formal sector is one in  which wages are determined by institutional
forces and is to be distinguished from the informal sector where labor earnings are much
more flexible.  The distinction between the self-employed and employees correspond
roughly to the division between the informnal  and the formal sectors. The distinction is
rough because the wage sector contains some workers who would be typically included
in the informal sector; they would be  workers in non-government services and small
manufacturing enterprises.
In the economy of Ghana some special segments of the labor market have to be
singled out for- attention because of their importance in the structure of employment.
Foremost is the sector producing  the most important exportable viz., cocoa.  Mining is
similarly important in  non-agriculture, though  because  of  the high  value added  per
worker in this sector, the number of workers affected is small. Because of its size, the
public sector has been extremely important in the Ghana labor market.  Its presence is
large both  in  non-tradable services and  in  manufacturing.  As  far  as  the  latter is
concerned, although potentially tradable, the manufacturing in Ghana has so far been
largely  a  special  form  of  non-tradable,  being mostly  an  import  substituting  sector.
Special interest also attaches to traders- mostly self-employed, in wholesale and retail
trade-because  they enjoyed a bonanza in the sharing of rent when the trade regime was
highly  restricted,  before  the  Economic  Recovery  Program;  and  subsequent  to  the
liberalization of  the regime must  have  suffered a  severe whittling  down of  the rent
element in their incomes.
1.2.  Multiple Occupations
The quantification of the different segments of the labor market in an economy
like that of Ghana is complicated  because of the prevalence of multiple occupations.
The same household would be involved in more than one sector, or as different working
members are involved in  activities in different sectors, or the same individual earner
divides  his  time  between  different  activities.  We  have two  options  in  classifying
households by sector.  If we want the households to be classified in mutually exclusive
groups we can allocate each household to that sector from which it derives the largest
portion of its income.  Alternatively, a household could be allocated to a sector if  any of
its earning member reports his/her participation in that sector.  If we go the latter route,
the same household could be allocated to more than one sector of activity, and the sum
of relative proportions would add up to more than 100 percent.  In their classification of
the Ghana labor market Appleton and Collier have adopted the second method.  In the
2absence of other work attempting  such classification, we  summarize their results  as
giving a rough outline of the relative importance of the different types of income earners
in the economy.
The  authors  analyzed  the  data  available  from  the  Social  Dimensions  of
Adjustment Survey  for  1988.  They listed  six  socio-economic groups to  which  the
households were assigned as follows;
i)  Households producing the exportable crop, cocoa;
ii)  Households producing other agricultural goods-basically  food;
iii) Households with one or members who are retail or wholesale traders;
iv) Households with one or more members in wage employment producing non-traded
goods and services ( excluding traders and government and services);
v)  Households with one or more members in wage employment producing
manufactured goods;
vi) Households with one or more members employed in providing government services.
The extent of multiple occupations can be seen from the following Table 1.1 of
incomes derived by the households in the sample from different sources which Appleton
and Collier have calculated.
Table 1.1: Percentage in per Capita Income Deciles
l  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
Govt.  3.1  6.7  8.5  10.4  8.6  10.0  10.9  13.7  15.6  12.6
NTG  8.4  8.5  9.7  11.8  11.7  8.8  11.1  8.9  10.9  10.2
Manu.  5.9  9.2  10.1  12.5  8.9  11.1  14.1  8.0  11.7  8.5
Traders  8.2  8.7  9.3  10.8  10.8  8.7  10.4  12.1  11.7  8.5
Cocoa  7.9  5.0  8.1  10.2  9.0  12.0  9.3  12.8  11.2  14.4
Food  10.5  11.2  11.0  10.3  9.8  9.7  9.2  1  0.2  9.3  8.8
Source:  Calculation  by Appleton  and Collier  (1990),  p.84..
The size of the groups and their mean and median incomes per capita are given in
Table 1.2. As already explained the same household may belong to more than one group
depending on the diversification of activities of their eaming members.  The figures are
not to be confused with eamings per worker in the different sectors.  The full distribution
of households by per capita income deciles is given in Appendix Table Al  of Appleton
and Collier (1990) paper.
3Table 1.2: Distribution of Income by Socio-Economic Groups
Size of  percent  Mean pey  Median  S.D. pcy  Poor
Groups  pcy  percent
Govt.  1,536  10.9  84,906  41,885  443,527  18.3
NTG  2,064  14.6  44,977  34,237  44,030  26.6
Manu.  575  4.2  43,751  36,598  37,255  25.2
Traders  5,241  37.1  43,705  35,554  35,465  26.2
Cocoa  2,227  15.8  52,210  39,460  64,605  21.0
Food  9,166  54.9  45,122  31,916  1,182,188  32.7
TOTAL  14,130  46,404  34,289  151,202
pcy = per capita income in cedis for Ghana
A Household is described as poor if it falls into the poorest 3 per cent capita income
deciles.
50urce: Table derived by Appleton and Collier(l990) from the SDA Survey of 1988,
p.83.
The figures are of interest in giving an indication of broad differences between
the income per capita of households in different groups after the Economic Recovery
Program had gone some way.  They will be referred to again at appropriate points in the
paper when we focus on the changing relative position of specific groups at different
points in the country's changing economic regimes.
One point of general importance might be emphasized here.  It is seen that the
median incomes per capita are much closer together than  the means.  This implies that
in  some  sectors  there  are considerably  greater  dispersion  of  incomes,  with  a  lager
proportion of households with relatively high incomes.  This is particularly true of the
government sector, and to a smaller extent the food sector. (The latter probably reflects
regional diversity in the peasant sector in Ghana).
1.3  The Impact of Government Policies on the Labor Markets
A narrow view of government interventions in labor markets would confine the
discussion only with those aspect of policy which have a direct impact on these markets.
In  the  formal  sector  public  sector  wage  and  employment  policy  obviously  is  an
important agent in Ghanaian context.  Furthermnore,  because of the importance of public
employment in the formal wage sector of the economy, these policies could be expected
to have ripple effects on its private subsector.  In particular, the public secure could  be
expected to act as a leader in the wage determination of the large-scale private firms.
4Extending our view to the rural private sector, government policy clearly has a
direct effect on the earnings of labor in the exportable sector - cocoa.  As an exportable,
the domestic price of cocoa received by the producers is heavily dependent on the value
of the exchange rate-which  the government of Ghana has tried to influence over many
years.  Additionally, the active role of the government in the marketing of cocoa has
meant that the margin of the selling price of cocoa going to the producers has been
heavily influenced by the government's fiscal policy.
Apart  from  these  direct  effects  on  labor  earnings,  the  indirect  effect  of
governnent  policies  extend  to  practically  all  the  socio-economic  groups  identified
above.  The peasant food producers respond to the rural-urban terms of trade and the
availability of  goods imported from the urban economy on which they can spend their
cash earnings from their marketed surplus.  These are heavily influenced by the state's
exchange rate and trade policies.  Besides, they will be affected by the state spending on
infrastructure and subsidies on agricultural inputs.  In the urban economy, investment
and capacity utilization is heavily influenced by demand conditions on the one hand, and
the supply of essential imported inputs on the other-both  of which are conditioned by a
whole  spectrum  of  monetary,  fiscal  and  state  policies.  The  resultant  course  of
productivity in manufacturing influences employment and wages in this sector.  Finally,
one  of  the  major  determinants of  the  incomes of  traders is  the  rent created in  the
economy as a direct result of the gap between administered and market prices in the
regulated economy.
We will now present a potted history of the evolution of government policies and
the  course  of the  Ghana's  economy,  with  particular  reference to  the  way  the  way
earnings and employment could have been affected in the different groups which have
been distinguished.
2.  Economic Policies and Basic Trends in the Economy
2.1.  Pre-1983
Ghana stands out among African countries as holding the unenviable record of
decline from a very strong economy.  Although it had one of the very highest per capita
incomes in the continent in the early 1960s, by 1982 it was ranked twenty-first out of
forty-four African countries (World Bank 1989, p.1 8). Although Ghana had its fair share
of economic shocks in the form of oil price increase, and severe droughts in 1975-77 and
again  in  1981-83,  the  massive  involvement  of  the  State  in  economic  affairs,  its
mismanagement, and excessive public spending clearly have been the root cause of the
decline. Income per capita declined by  30 per  cent between  1970 and  1983, but  the
deterioration of the economy outside the peasant food producing sector was much more
destructive.  Cocoa -the mainstay of Ghana's export earnings-had  a level of production
in 1983 of just 28 per cent of its level of 1965  This was the joint result of overtaxing of
5cocoa farmers and the massive overvaluation of the exchange rate.  While Ghanaian
cocoa producers received  15 to  40 per  cent  of prevailing world  prices, those  in the
competitor  neighboring  country Cote  d'Ivoire  received at  least  66  per  cent.  Thus
production went up significantly in Cote d'Ivoire in the same period, and its share in the
world market increased from 13 to 30 per cent (World Bank 1994, p.156).
The  overtaxing  of  cocoa  farmers  in  Ghana  eroded  the  revenue  base  as  it
depressed  production  and  encouraged  smuggling.  In  spite  of  falling  revenues
government spending increased unconstrained by budgetary considerations-quite  a bit
of it due to grants to public enterprises.  At the peak of the fiscal imbalance in 1976 the
budget deficit amounted to  11.3 per cent of GDP.  The inflation rate as a result went
quickly from single to double and even triple digit levels-the  average being 58 per cent
in the decade of  1972-82.  The process of  inflation eroded real wages  in the formal
sector, including the public sector.  It had reached levels at which attempts to protect the
real  value  of  wages  were  quickly  eroded  by  the  consequent  budget  deficit  and
accelerated  inflation.  Government policy  makers found  it  politically  impossible  to
change the nominal exchange rate during the inflationary spiral.  Instead the balance of
payments  deficits  which  the  inflating real  exchange  rate  caused  were  sought to  be
controlled by quantitative import restrictions.  The shortage of essential  intermediate
goods  dislocated  production  in  non-agriculture  and  had  a  severe  effect  on  the
infrastructure.  The public sector protected employment, but at the end of the period real
wages of public employees were no more than 25 per cent of their level around 1970. It
is not hard to imagine the dive in efficiency of government services which this must have
caused.
2.2  The Economic  Recovery  Program  (ERP) and After
The program agreed to  with  international help in  1983 involved  measures to
stabilize the economy in the first place, followed by policies  of structural reform on
several fronts.  A major effort was made on the exchange rate front leading to a massive
devaluation as the.  black market premium on foreign exchange fell from 2000 per cent in
1983-6 to 21 per cent in 1987-91. It virtually disappeared in 1992-4. On the fiscal side  a
sharp increase in revenue as a result of a successful readjustment of its sources made it
possible  both to narrow the fiscal imbalance and raise the level of expenditure.  The
stabilization of the monetary base led to significant fall in the inflation rate.
The decline in the rate of increase of the consumer price level also saw a marked
improvement of the internal terms of trade in favor of the rural sector-according  to one
source  the  ratio  of  the  wholesale  price  index  of  manufactured  goods  to  that  of
agriculture, forestry and fishing fell by more than 25 percent  between 1983-6 and 1992-
94 (World Bank  1995, p.16).  The relative increase in the price of tradable-which  in
Ghana are mostly of rural origin-was  one source of the shift.  Other factors were the
general rise  in  real consumption  boosting the  demand for  food,  and  the  erosion of
scarcity prices for importables, including essential inputs for urban goods and services.
6It is also likely that the margin enjoyed by traders-particularly  in the urban areas-had
fallen with the stabilization of the economy.
The stabilization measures saw a remarkable turnaround in the economy.  Overall
GDP growth rate increased from minus 1 percent to plus 5 per cent in the first five years
of  the  ERP.  Total  merchandise export  grew  at  22  per  cent  per  annum,  with  the
traditional exports, logs and cocoa growing the fastest. Real wages recovered to some
extent  in the  formal sector, as  the rate of  inflation fell.  In the  public  sector some
retrenchment allowed a greater part of the wage bill to be used to support recovery of
real earnings.
The measures of structural adjustment of the economy seem to have been less
successful.  The public sector still dominates the formal labor market.  Liberalization on
the trade front has not led to the  expected increase in  manufacturing output.  Public
enterprises continue to be important and generally a drag on the efficient growth of the
non-agricultural sector.
2.3  Recent Shocks
An adverse development has been the decline in Ghana's  terms of trade since
1987. In 1994 it stood at a level more than 25 per cent below that of 1987.  It has been
pointed out that the net aid flow has virtually been wiped out by the terms of trade loss
(World Bank  1994, figure 4.1,p.155).  Some authors have argued that the foreign aid
flow  has  prevented  depreciation  of the  Ghanaian  currency  in  the  foreign  exchange
market  to reflect the terms of trade deterioration  (Younger, 1994). But  it should be
remembered that the net foreign aid was less than 5 per cent of Ghana's  GDP, well
below the average of 8 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa (ibid., p.155).
More recently the fiscal situation has deteriorated.  The fiscal  shock of 1992 was
triggered  by  a  large  across-the-board increase  in  wages  for  civil  servants  and  was
accentuated by a fall in tax revenue and a shortfall in foreign aid.  The narrow fiscal
account went from a surplus of 1.5 percent  of GDP to a deficit of  4.8 percent  in 1992
and deficits of 5.6 in  1993 and 4.3 in  1995-- reversing the improving trend of the last
seven years.  The attendant expansion of money supply triggered a reversal of inflation
trend as well.  After falling to 10 per cent in 1992, the rate of inflation shot up to 25 per
cent in  1993-1994, and more than 50 percent in  1995- 1996.  The indirect impact on
savings and investment seems to have been severe.  The upward trend in gross private
investment was interrupted in  1991, has continued to decline since then, and could be
directly related to  the macro-economic instability.  While public  investment tried to
make up for the shortfall, it could do so only at the cost of public dis-saving, and at the
same time private savings fell (World Bank 1995, pp. 9).
73.  The Formal Sector
3.1  The Pre-ERP period
3.1.1  Employment
Ghana's  employment in the  formal sector has been  dominated by  the public
sector  for  a  long  time,  and  it  seems  to  be  more  true  in  the  post  ERP  era.  The
employment series are summarized in Table  3.1 reproduced from ISSER 1994 (Table
8.4).
Table:  3.1:  Formal Sector Employment, 1960-1991 ('000)
Annual Change (percent)
Year  Private  Public  All Sectors  All  Public  SOPSE(
Sector  Sector  Sectors  percent)
1960  149  184  333  - - 44.7
1965  118  278  396  +3.8  +10.2  29.8
1970  110  288  398  +0.1  +0.7  27.6
1975  137  318  455  +2.9  +2.1  30.1
1980  46  291  337  -5.2  -1.7  13.6
1985  67  397  463  +7.5  +7.3  14.5
1986  66  347  414  -10.8  -12.6  15.9
1987  79  315  394  -4.8  -9.2  20.0
1988  55  252  307  -22.1  -20.0  17.9
1989  38  177  215  -30.0  -29.8  17.7
1990  40  189  229  +6.5  +6.8  17.5
1991  31  136  186  -18.8  -17.5  16.1
Source:  Ghana Statistical Service Quarterly Digest of Statistics
SOPSE= Share of private sector in total formal sector employment
Ghana ISSER 1994, Table 8.4, p. 139.
The major expansion in public sector employment took place before 1965. Over
the next two decades the public sector increased its work force by 40 per cent-about  the
same relative increase as it had achieved in a single five-year period between 1960 and
1965.  In the decade of 1965-75 the public sector employment increased at about the
same rate as the private sector.  Although the growth rate of employment in the formal
sector had slowed down considerably, the public sector did not try to inflate it by over-
zealous expansion. It was during the severe decline in formal employment during the
crisis  years  of  1975-80 that  the  share  of  the  public  sector  in  formal  employment
8increased  significantly.  Private formal  employment  fell drastically  to a third of its level.
Public employment  also fell, but to a much smaller  extent as the state tried to hold the
line on formal employment.  But in spite of this effort, total employment  in the formal
sector in 1980  was only three-quarters  of the level of 1975,  and the private sector  share
of formal  employment reached  its lowest  level of 13.6  percent.
3.1.2.  Wages
The course  of real earnings  per worker  employed  in the formal  sector is plotted in
Figure 3.1 (reproduced  from ISSER  Figure 8.2,  p.159). It shows  that the drastic  decline
in real wages  took place in the decade  of 1974-83. If the cost of living deflator  is to be
believed  the level of real wages in 1983 was a mere 12 per cent of its level in 1974 (
ISSER, p.151).  This decline in real wage was due to the failure of nominal wage
increase  to keep pace with the increasing  rate of inflation. It was also the result of a
deliberate  policy of the government  as the dominant  employer  to choose to reduce  the
wage bill, as much as  it  could, through wage decline rather than a  reduction in
employment. Between  1960  and 1985  while employment  in the formal sector (with  the
public sector providing  an increasing  share) increased  by 40 per cent, real wage fell by
more than 80 per cent. Thus in spite  of the employment  increase  the wage bill fell pari
passu with the decline in GDP per capita and  government  revenue, but clearly the
employment  situation  would  have been  much  worse if the government  had opted in favor
of protecting  real wage  rather  than employment.
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used to compute real earnings.)
93.2  Post-ERP Developments
3.2.1  The Public Sector
In the years following  the ERP there has  been clearly  an attempt to reverse  the
employment-real  wage trade off implicit in  the policies of the previous era.  The
government  was persuaded  to cut employment  and increase  the wage  of the smaller  work
force  in the interests  of efficiency. The public sector  employment  was cut by 60 per cent
between 1985 and 1991 ( see Table 3.1 above). But at the same time real wage in the
public sector  went up by 170  per cent over this period,  including  a major hike of 80 per
cent in 1992  ( World Bank 1994,  table 4.2, p.  165). This  put the public  sector wage back
to its 1970  level,  but it was still only 72 per cent of its peak  in.  the early sixties.
3.2.2  The Private  Sector
The recovery phase  1983-87 saw a  significant increase of  private sector
employment,  and a slower  growth of public employment. The private share of formal
employment  (SOPSE)  climbed  to a level of 20 per cent.  But the figures bear adequate
testimony to the story, that whatever might have happened  in the rural and the urban
informal  sectors,  recovery  in the formal  wage sector  has not been sustained.  In the period
1987-91  private employment  fell drastically.  In fact in 1991  it was only 70 per cent of its
level in 1.980.  This time the public sector,  under pressure  from the adjustment  program,
offered  only limited  buffer  for the decline  in employment.
The setback after 1987 is evidently  related to the trade liberalization  measures
which were strengthened  in the second phase of the program.  This disappointing  trend
in employment  is related  to the fortunes  of the Ghanaian  private manufacturing  sector in
the post adjustment  period and will be discussed  further  at a later  point in the paper.
The average  real earnings  in the private  formal sector seem to have increased  at
the same rate as real wages in the public sector in the post-ERP period until 1988 (
World Bank, ibid.). But did private  sector wages fall to as low levels as they did in the
public sector in the years of accelerating  inflation before the ERP?  Unlike the public
sector, the private employer could be expected  not to let wages fall below a threshold
which would  actually lead to a proportionately  greater fall in efficiency  than wages  per
worker.  Nor is  the  latter obliged to  follow a  policy which favors retention of
employment  more than falling wages. In fact, we have already  seen that private formal
employment  fell sharply  while the public sector work force was expanding  in the years
prior to the ERP.  Aggregate earnings data do suggest that in  1988, private sector
average earnings were higher than those in  the public sector; the  private-public
differential  was 1.46. This differential  in favor of the private sector seems to have been
whittled down in the years after 1988 as public sector wages increased further.  The
-over-all  private-public  earnings  ratio stood at 1.07  in 1991  (ISSER,  Table 8.14, p.153).
The massive  wage  increase  of 80 per cent in the public  sector in 1992  must have pushed
this ratio much further  down although  the data are not available  for more recent years
from this source.
103.3  Evaluation
3.3.1  Is the Size  of Employment  in the Public  Sector  too Large?
The public sector in Ghana  consists of two distinct types: government  services;
and public commercial  enterprises. Leechor  has tried to put together the available  data
on employment  in the different  types of public employment  in 1987 and 1992. These
data  are reproduced  in Table 3.2 below.
Table 3.2: Number of Public Sector Employees, 1987  and 1992
Group  1987  1992
Core civil services'  131,089  102,173
Education  services  159,000  167,370
Subvented  organizationsb&c  81,574  69,574
Security  organiationsd  29,000  29,000
Government  services  400,663  368,117
Net retrenchment, 1987 to 1992  --  --
Public enterprisese  250,000  227,000
Net retrenchment, 1987 to 1992  --  --
Total public  sector  650,663  595,117
Net retrenchment, 1987 to 1992  --
--  Not applicable
a.  Between  1987  and 1972  a few organizations  were added to the civil service,
including  the highway  authority  and the audit service.
b.  Some  employees  of Subvented  organizations  were transferred  to the core  civil
service  between  the two periods.
c.  Includes  estimates  of agencies  not covered  inn  the controller  and accountant
general's  payroll,  such  as the internal  revenue  service  and customs  services.
d.  Includes  the police,  arned forces,  and civil defense  organizations
e.  Data are derived  from partial  coverage  of public enterprises.
Source:  Government of Ghana State Enterprise Commission (1992); Adaptedfirom
Leechor (1994).
The statistics show retrenchment  of the order of 10 per cent during these five
years of adjustment. But considerable  doubt exists about the large size of the sector in
Ghana's economy.
Public Civil Services: Leechor has pointed out that in  spite of several rounds of
retrenchment  Ghana's civil service remains one of the largest in Africa relative to the
11country's  population (Figure  3.2).  But in  spite of the size, institutional capacity for
effective public action remains weak.  The large size of the sector hampers adequate
supervisory and management  oversight.
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Public Enterprises:  Public  enterprises  played  a  dominant  role  in  the  evolution  of
Ghana's  formal sector throughout the post-independence period. They established an
important position in almost all sectors of the economy.  Ghana is reported to have more
than 300 public enterprises- more than any other African country other than Tanzania.
Commander and Ugaz (Table 1, p.1 32) collected data from official sources for 224 non-
financial state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  In 1990 the total employment in these  SOEs
was calculated as 224 thousand (as against total employment in the formal private sector
of under 40 thousand).  The authors found that between 1986 and 1990 employment in
the  17 core SOEs  fell by  16 per  cent.  The government realizes the  importance of
reducing the dominance of SOEs in the economy.  According to Leechor 63 out of 314
firms had been "divested" between 1989 and 1991, but it seems most of these are minor
ones (p. 169). Progress has been slow and bogged down in the mire of political concerns.
For example,  the government announced in 1992 that private companies would be free
to trade in  Cocoa, but this  "privilege" was confined to  the domestic market.  Cocoa
exporting remained the preserve of the monolithic Cocoa Board which was also granted
the responsibility  of licensing private  companies supposed to  be  in competition  with
itself.
The public enterprises enjoy considerable advantages over private concerns in the
form  of  financial  assistance,  use  of  state  owned  commercial  assets,  special  tax
concessions, as well as monopolistic market situation.  It is clear that, given the narrow
savings base  in  the  economy, public  investment has  tended to  "crowd  out"  private
investment  particularly in the formal sector. It is remarkable that the private investment
rate has been well  below the public throughout the post-ERP era, except for 1990-91.
After registering a recovery between 1987 and  1991, the private rate of investment fell
back to low levels, and in 1994 was hovering around its usual level of around 4.4 percent
compared to the public investment rate of 11.4 percent  of GDP.
123.3.2  Are Public Sector Wages too High?
We saw at the end of Section 3.2.2 that  public sector wages seemed to have
pulled ahead of private  formal sector wages  in recent years.  But even if the figures of
mean earnings  quoted above seem to suggest this, we cannot conclude that the public
sector has unambiguously higher levels of earnings without further probing.  There are
two reasons for this:
a.  The quality of labor found in the two types of employment is different.  To measure
the "true" earnings difference between the sectors we must at least control for
differences in measurable human capital characteristics of the work force employed
by them.
b.  We shall soon see that there are large differences in wage levels within the private
wage earners. In particular the wage level increases significantly with the size of
firms in the private sector. We need to make some judgment as to where in this
hierarchy of earnings the supply price of labor lies. It is possible that the level of
wages in the large private firms reflects the strength of union pressures or other
institutional influences.
The first set of issues is easier to tackle than the second.  The distribution of
workers by educational levels in the sample covered by the GLSS does show that the
public sector employees are better educated, as shown in the Table below (Table 3.3),
although the gap might have been reduced in terms of years of education.  Thus we
would expect a differential in favor of the public sector on this account.  On the other
hand the somewhat larger proportion of females in the public sector would tend to bring
the differential down if in fact there is a significant gender gap in earnings.
Table 3.3  Percentage Distribution of Employees by Education and Gender
Year  Sector  Primary  Middle  Secondary  Post-  Males  Females
Secondary
1987  Public  4.8  63.5  17.9  13.8  75.3  24.2
Formal  12.2  71.4  15.5  0.8  82.4  17.6
Private
1992  Public  5.1  59.3  32.1  2.9  71.3  28.7
Formal  5.7  70.9  23.1  0.4  80.3  19.7
Private
Source: GLSS.
13Dar, Tzannatos, Canagarajah and Thomas (1997) have fitted earnings functions
to the GLSS samples for the 1987-8 and  1991-2 periods (Table 3).  Their results are
reproduced in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4  Coefficients of Earnings Function and Contribution of Explanatory
Variables to Inequality
1987^88  1991-92
Coefficient  Explained  Inequality  Coefficient  Explained  Inequality
(SD units)  (Percent)  (SD units)  (Percent)
C  2.453*  0.000  0  3.182*  0.000  0
Female  0.125  0.004  2  -0.006  0.000  0
Age  0.031  0.070  39  0.038*  0.090  43
Age2 0  -0.0002  -0.039  -22  -0.0003  -0.053  -25
Schooling  0.030*  0.053  30  0.056*  0.138  66
Public  0.560*  0.087  49  0.243*  0.037  17
State  0.488*  0.006  3  0.057  -0.001  0
Union  0.420*  -0.005  -3  -0.003  0.000  0
Urban  -0.072  0.003  2  -0.039  -0.001  0
0.178  100  0.210  100
SD ln(Wages)=  0.761  0.774
R2=  :  0.234  0.272
SD*R2=  _  0.178  0.210
Source: Dar et al, 1997;
* Significant  at the 5 percent  level.
For  both  dates  age  and  education  are  important  determinants  of  earnings
differences and of degree of inequality in the wage sector along with the public-private
divide.  In fact most of the observed  inequality is almost entirely due to  these three
attributes. There are, however, significant changes in the relative importance of the three
factors between these two dates.  In particular, the impact of education as an explanation
of earnings differences seemed to have increased markedly relative to the public sector
influence.  This  is  seen both  in  terms of  the enhanced  coefficient of  the  education
variable in the earnings function, as well as in the percentage  of earnings inequality
accounted  for  by  theses  two  variables.  The  premium  associated  in  public  sector
employment has dropped from around 55 per cent to 24 per cent (after controlling for the
other factors). At the same time the share of inequality due to  education has doubled
from 30 to 66 per cent, while that due to public sector has declined from 49 to just  17 per
cent.  These are dramatic changes which  suggest strongly that  the importance of the
public sector in offering premium wage differentials has been reduced drastically in the
wage paying sector of Ghana.  There are, however, two important caveats to keep in
mind.
First,  comparing the distribution of employees by education levels, as given in
Table 3.3 it is seen that a much larger proportion of employees with secondary education
14are found in the public sector relative to those with less education.  Those with post-
secondary education have inexplicably disappeared  from the  scene, with  only  small
proportions found in both the public and the private sectors.  (In fact, the GLSS for
1991-2 reports that fully a quarter of those with post-secondary education were in the
"non-working"  category).  Whether  or  not  this  disappearance  of  post-secondary
employees is a  real phenomenon or  not, the higher proportion of the educated with
secondary  levels in the public sector in  1991-2 compared to the earlier date is a clear
characteristic of the sample.  In so far as the recruitment to the public sector is correlated
with  secondary education this  change  in  characteristics would  tend  to  increase  the
importance in earnings differentials relative to the public-private divide.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the large increase in public sector wage
scales in July 1992 is unlikely to be reflected in the earnings data from the 1991-2 GLSS
survey.  Unfortunately we do not yet have an earnings survey of the GLSS type for a
more recent date.
In the absence of such analysis, we try to draw some tentative conclusions using
additional  data  sources.  We  have  some  detailed  information  on  earnings  in  the
manufacturing sector of Ghana from the sample surveys conducted by the World Bank
under the auspices of the Research Program on Enterprise Development (RPED).  These
surveys  of  enterprises  and  a  sample  of  workers  attached  to  each  enterprise  were
conducted in three 'waves'  in each of the years of 1992, 1993 and  1994.  The data of
mean  earnings by  size group  of  firms  are  reported  in  Table  3.5  together  with  an
estimated mean of monthly earnings in the public sector after the 80 per cent wage hike
of  1992.  The  spread  in  mean  earnings over  the  firms  of  different  size  groups is
enormous, and will be discussed later.  For the moment we can note that compared to the
manufacturing sector, average earnings in the public sector were generally at a higher
level than even those prevailing in the large firms.  In 1992 mean earnings in the public
sector were 58 per cent higher than the average in large firms and more than four times
higher than the average earnings of workers in micro enterprises.  It might be objected
that the survey data for private manufacturing firms in 1992 had been collected too close
to the period of the public sector wage hike, and the ripple effect of the latter might be
more truly captured in the data for 'wave 2' of 1993.  But even this comparison (which
does not allow for price increase over the year) shows that mean public wages were 28
per cent higher than the average earnings in the large firms.
15Table 3.5:  Earnings of Worker by Employment Size of Enterprises in
Manufacturing, Average Earnings in the Public Sector and the Minimum Wage
1992-94
Earnings in
Manufacturing:  Wave 1 (1992)  Wave 2 (1993)  Wave 3 (1994)
(monthly, in cedis)
Large (100+).  41,420  48,876  56,849
Medium (30-100)  31,820  38,392  41,017
Small (5-29)  17,943  25,098  26,682
Micro (<5)  13,419  13,161  14,264
All  25,696  33,272  36,215
Average Earnings in  62,687
the Public Sector
Minimum Wage  13,617
Source:  The data for the manufacturing enterprises are generated by the RPED surveys
and are taken from the analysis of  F. Teal (1996), Table 3, p. 971.
The average public sector earnings for 1991 are taken from ISSER 1994, Table
8.14, p.  153.  They have been blown up by 80 percent  in the across-the-board wage
increase granted to public employees in July 1992.  The figure for the minimum wage is
from the same source, adjusted by the cost-of-living index for Accra.
While the figures of average wages in Table 3.5 strongly suggest that the recent
wage hike has taken public sector wages to  a new plateau-exceeding  wages in the
private formal sector by a substantial margin, the evidence is not conclusive because we
are not able to control for differences in the quality of labor.  It is possible to have more
conclusive evidence if we confine ourselves to the sub-sector of public enterprises.  The
RPED surveys include state owned enterprises along with private manufacturing firms.
The earnings regressions performed on the sample of all male workers covered by this
data set by Francis Teal is reproduced in Table 3.6. Teal pooled the data for all three
waves.  Price changes between the surveys were controlled for by the use  of dummy
variables for the three years.
16Table 3.6:  Earnings Equation for All Workers and Apprentices who Earn:  Full-time  and Male
Dependent  Variable In (earnings).
Variables  Equation (1)  Equation (2)
Constant  7.3  5.49
(3.5)  (22.2)
Age  0.06  0.17
(5.7)  (15.4)
Age 2 -0.001  -0.002
(4.6)  (12.8)
Education (in years)  0.02  0.032
(3.9)  (5.4)
Tenure  0.01  0.02
(3.3)  (5.5)
In Size  0.08  0.09
(4.0)  (3.7)
Union  0.21  0.25
(4.8)  (3.7)
Firm Age  -0.009  -0.005
(6.2)  (5.7)
Profits per employee  0.05  0.05
(5.1)  (4.2)
In Capital/Labor ratio  -0.02  0.005
(1.8)  (0.4)
Foreign ownership  0.18  0.17
(4.3)  (3.60)
State ownership  0.35  0.32
(5:0)  (3.1)
Wave 2  0.21  0.24
(5.2)  (4.96)
Wave 3  0.32  0.32
(8.3)  (3.9)
Adjusted R 3 0.72  0.57
F (D.F.)++  3.9(56,1439)*  2.0(42,1460)
X2 (White test) (D.F.)  529  (389)  385 (231)
Number of  1,526  1,526
observations
* indicates  pooling  is rejected  at the 1%  significance  level.
+Equations  (1) and  (2) both  control  for sector  and location  effects. Equation  (1) also controls  for
occupation  while equation  (2) does not.
++ The F test is a test for  the validity  of pooling  the regression.
The absolute  value  of t statistics  are in parenthesis  where  the standard  errors  have been  corrected  by
White's  method  (1980).
Source: Teal (1996).
The regression  models control not only for the human capital characteristic  of
workers,  but also for a number  of variables  pertaining  to the enterprises  themselves. It is
seen that the ownership  variable  is strong  and significant  in spite of the large number  of
17explanatory variables used.  For our present topic the important result to note is that the
"net" effect of state ownership is to raise the level of earnings by 32-35 per cent over the
level of private sector firms with African ownership.  This effect is larger than foreign
ownership-which  is  also  significant but  raises earnings  by only  17 to  18 per cent
compared to the African-owned firms.
3.3.3  The Distribution of Earnings
It is not enough to consider merely the difference in mean earnings between the
public and private sectors, even if we are able to control for differences in the quality of
labor to some extent.  The wage structure in the public sector, as it has evolved during
the large changes in nominal wages in the last decade is of major interest.  On the one
hand, we would want to see if the earnings of workers at the bottom of the distribution
have  fallen  so  low,  relative  to  the  other  sectors,  that  efficiency  of  performance is
impaired. On the other hand, it is desirable that the structure of earnings should be wide
enough to allow for the possibility that higher skills and responsibilities are adequately
rewarded.
We refer back to the  comparative distributions of per capita incomes in different
sectors, including public employment, produced by Appleton and Collier from  the data
set of the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Survey conducted in  1988, and presented
above in Table  1.2 above. It will be recalled that the researchers allowed for multiple
occupations.  The statistics reported are  the per capita household income, pooling the
income of earners of members from all sources-and  not the distribution of earnings in
the particular sector.
The data presented show that while mean and  median  per capita incomes of
households in the "government" group were significantly higher than those in the other
groups, they also had a smaller proportion of households in the "poor" or bottom three
deciles, and a larger proportion of households in the top deciles than the over-all sample
of  households  surveyed.  We  can  conclude  from  these  distributions  that  workers
depending partly on government work had higher income levels at the bottom of the
distribution, and had also a wider distribution of income than the other socio-economic
groups distinguished.
Between  1988 and  1992, the government  tried  to  follow  an  incomes policy
according to which average real earnings were held more or less constant, while salary
differentials were permitted to widen across grade levels and occupational categories.
This was tantamount to widening the earnings distribution further.  However, in July
1992 the government announced an across the board increase of public sector wages by
80 per cent-which  clearly had the effect of squeezing the earnings structure at the same
time as it pushed up the levels of income of public sector employees at the bottom of the
distribution further.
The finding from the statistics presented so far that public sector workers in the
late eighties enjoyed a higher level of  income at the lower end of the distribution than
workers in other sectors is corroborated by some work on the earnings of workers laid
18off by the government.  Alderman et al (1996) surveyed 506 former government workers
who had been redeployed  (the date of the survey was the second half of 1991) . Most of
the redeployees came from the lower echelons of the civil service: 80  percent  of them
had held unskilled jobs.  The researchers found that while 85 per cent of the retrenched
workers  had  another  job  at  the  time  of  the  survey  their  average  earnings  were
considerably below what they had earned before.  They estimate earnings functions for
the redeployed, with and without corrections for selectivity bias, and concluded: "The
returns to human capital do not differ before and after retrenchment; earnings simply
shift down..  .For those redeployees currently working, earnings fell... on an average of
their previous earnings.  This, however, is a mean over a heterogeneous group..  .The few
redeployees who have found work in the wage sector have fared reasonably well, but the
remainder have suffered substantial declines in income, even those who are currently
fully employed.  For the underemployed farmers, earnings have all but disappeared."
(Alderman et al, 1996)
Alderman et al (1996) interpreted the difference in  earnings before and after
redeployment as evidence of "rent"  associated with  civil service employment.  They
write: "In both types of models, the earnings decline is captured  entirely by a downward
shift in the (earnings) functions intercept.  While it is possible that this reflects the loss
of a good job match, that interpretation is implausible when we consider that virtually all
the redeployees who did not volunteer had unskilled jobs as sweepers, messengers etc.  It
is difficult to believe that their civil service earnings were above market rates because
they had special skills that made such posts a good job  match.  The notion that public
sector employees, especially at the lower echelons, were simply allowed above market
earnings seems much more realistic."
Some  doubts  remain  about  the  rather  strong  conclusions  on  this  point  by
Alderman et al.  In particular as already pointed out, and as emphasized by themselves,
the difference in earnings was pronounced for those who found jobs  as self-employed.
The literature of labor in developing countries (and elsewhere) have emphasized that the
self employed are likely to show lower mean earnings than the employees ( even without
under-reporting of  incomes) principally because of two  reasons:  first,  the  efficiency
wage mechanism establishes a bottom for wage employees, in so far as no employer
would  offer  a  wage  below  the  threshold  at  which  efficiency  begins  to  decline
proportionately more than  the wage.  No such threshold holding up the minimum wage,
of course,  exist for  people working  for themselves; second, the  self-employed have
expectation of earnings from their entrepreneurial initiatives particularly at a later age if
and when they are established.
The point about the rental element in public sector wages would be strengthened
if we have evidence about a difference in earnings between public sector employees and
wage  employees  in  the  private  sector-and  particularly  wage  earners  in  the  non-
corporate or informal private sector. It is to an analysis of this topic that we now turn.
4.  Firm Size and Wage Levels in Ghana's Manufacturing Sector
19Detailed data exist from the surveys of enterprises and their workers conducted in
the manufacturing sector of Ghana by the Research Program of Enterprise Development
(RPED) of the World Bank.  As already mentioned we have the data  in three waves
between 1992 and 1994.  This material will be used to investigate the variation in labor
earnings  by  size  of  establishment  in  the  manufacturing sector  of  Ghana,  since the
sampled enterprises covered the entire spectrum from the micro to the very large.  The
topic is particularly important for assessing the extent of wage difference between the
informal  (small)  and  the  formal  (large)  sectors  in  manufacturing,  and  the  role  of
institutional factors  in causing theses differences.
4.1  Analysis by Teal
We have already referred to the work by Frances Teal on earnings function using
the RPED data.  His estimation of the function reproduced in Table 3.6 above, showed
that, after controlling for human capital characteristics of the worker and profitability
and  capital-intensity  of  the  enterprise,  earnings  increased  by  -firm size  in  a  rather
substantial  way.  Teal  in  these  equations  used  the  logarithm  of  firn  size  as  the
explanatory variable.  The  high  significance  of  this  variable  showed  that  earnings
increased with firm size a in a non-linear way.  The elasticity of earnings with respect to
firm size varied from 0.07 to 0.13.
It  is more interesting to  have an idea of  the way labor earnings increase for
different size groups of firms.  For this, one needs  to use dummies of different  size
groups of firms in the earnings function.  In another piece of analysis Teal does just this
(Teal  1994).  Data for all workers for the first two waves are pooled and an earnings
function  is  estimated with  the following  variables: age;  highest  level  of  education;
occupation;  location;  industry;  unionization-along  with  firm  size  dummies,  and  a
dummy to control for the change between the two years. Teal summarizes the results of
our interest as follows:
"Standardizing  for skill, workers in small  firms, which are those employing  between  5 and 29 workers,
earn  21 per cent more  than  workers  in microfirms ie., those  employing  5 or less. Medium  sizedfirms, i.e.
those employing  30 and 100 workers,  pay an additional  14 per cent, while the category  of large  firms,
those employing  more than 100  workers  pay afurther 13  per cent. The  cumulative  effect  of these  earning
differences  across  firms is that workers  in  firms employing  more  than 100 workers  earn 55 per cent more
than those  working  in micro  firms.. " (Teal 1994,  p. 13, using  results  from Table 1).
Referring back to the topic of the last section, it should be emphasized that sate
owned enterprise are generally large firms.  Thus the earnings level in public enterprises,
which were seen to enjoy a premium of 35 per cent or so, could be as much as 100 per
cent more than in the micro enterprises ( after controlling for all the other significant
factors affecting wages).
4.2  Analysis by Mazumdar
Mazumdar's  work (1994,  1995) on the RPED data  for a  number of different
countries follows a  different procedure.  The purpose of the empirical  work on  the
earnings data is to classify size groups of enterprises in each country which tend to show
different levels of earnings.  This way we seek to avoid the imposition of an arbitrary
20classification of enterprises by working with the same size group in each country.  The
first step in our procedure is then to see the distribution of  the earnings of workers of
"equivalent quality" with respect to the enterprise size in which they work.  First, we try
to  get at the earnings of labor of "equivalent quality"  by  controlling for observable
human  capital  factors:  experience,  education,  apprenticeship,  and  permanence  of
employment.  In addition, industry dummies are used as control variables in the earnings
function.
Secondly,  we use the estimated earnings function to obtain the "residuals" for
each observation  (i.e. individual worker) used in the regression.  These residuals could
be plotted against the employment size of the enterprise of the employee in a scatter
diagram. It soon became apparent, however, that the scatter diagram created in this way
contained too much "noise" to yield any meaningful  observations about the nature of
variations  of earnings with  enterprise size.  We then tried to  reduce  the "noise"  by
grouping the enterprises into a large number of size groups, and plotting the median of
the residuals in each individual group against the size groups.' The reduced number of
observations in the scatter which this procedure permits makes it possible to read into the
diagram the way the level of earnings of labor of "equivalent quality" seems to  change
with size groups. This empirical procedure helps us to distinguish several categories of
size  groups  which  show  significant  variations  in  the  levels  of  earnings  i.e.,  the
"residuals" after controlling for the human capital determinants of earnings.  Table 4.1
sets out the size groups of establishments for each category  which were identified  in the
different  countries.  Note  that apart  from the size groups  differing somewhat from
country to country within each category (micro, small etc.),  the empirical procedure
distinguished fewer categories for some countries than for others.
Table 4.1:  Size Groups Identified within each Category for Different Countries
Category  Kenya  Zambia  Zimbabwe  Cameroon  Ghana
Micro  0-5  0-15  0-10  0-5  0-13
(5.6)  (18.6)  (9.2)  (6.7)  (14.0)
Small  5-20  15-50  10-80  5-19  13-34
(14.0)  (25.8)  (27.4)  (20.4)  (20.7)
Medium  20-70  50-180  80-200  19-50  34-90
(41.0)  (33.7)  (25.9)  (32.9)  (34.2)
Large 1  70-200  180+  200-400  60-200  90-225
(22.0)  (22.5)  (19.3)  (25.6)  (15.0)
Large 2  200-400  400-1500  200+  225+
(9.2)  (13.6)  (14.5)  (16.1)
Very Large  400+  1500+
(8.3)  (4.6)
Total (N)  1015  708  1334  781  386
Medians are  used  rather  than means  to avoid  the  influence  of extreme  values.
21Note:  Figures in parenthesis are the percentage of the total sample of male workers in
each category.
Source:  Mazumdar (1994), Table 1, p. 4.
Of the five countries considered, Zimbabwe  seems to stand apart on its own.  A
larger percentage of the workers  are to be found in very large firms, and earnings levels
seem to increase through successive levels of size groups to the largest group employing
1500 or more workers.  All the other countries attain the highest level of wages in much
lower size groups.  Zambia, Cameroon and Ghana have the highest wage level in the
200+ size group, while Kenya has it in the 400+ group.  The definitions of the micro,
small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  differ  in  detail  from  country  to  country,  but
generally they are all within a generally accepted range.
Earnings  fimctions  were  estimated  for  each  country,  using  the  size  groups
defined in Table 4.2.  We performed the exercise  by using the size group dummies
which  were  identified  in  the  first  step  for  each  country  as  explanatory  variables,
together with the control variables defined above:  Experience; (experience) 2; education
dummies; industry dummies; and dummies defining if the worker had an apprenticeship
or  not,  and  if  the  worker was  permanent or  not.  The values  of the  enterprise  size
coefficients from the estimated equations are given in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2:  Coefficients of Enterprise Size Dummies
(with human capital control variables in the regression)
Category  |  Kenya  |  Zambia  |  Zimbabwe  Cameroon  Ghana
Small  0.21  0.15  0.45  0.3  0.31
Medium  0.34  0.25  0.56  0.35  0.43
Large 1  0.64  0.61  0.43  0.53
Large 2  0.53  0.63  1.08  0.64  0.65
Very Large  0.6  1.32
Adjusted R2  0.313  0.455  0.362  0.492  0.298
Source: Mazumdar (1994), p.6.
Except for Kenya, the values of the coefficients increase successively with the
size groups. Our visual procedure of distinguishing the size categories have been largely
successful.
The base  used  for  the  size  group  dummies  is  the  "micro"  category  for  all
countries.  The values of the coefficients in Table 4.2  thus show the relative increase in
earnings  with  respect  to  the  micro  enterprises,  and  the  incremental  values  of  the
22coefficients of the successive size-groups give the  relative increase as one moves to a
higher size category.
It is seen that the structure of earnings related to size groups in Ghana is very
similar to that in  the Cameroon.  In the Eastern African countries of Kenya and Zambia,
the jump in earnings as one moves from micro to small firms are smaller.  But then the
latter two have a sharper increase in earnings than Ghana between the medium and large
categories, leaving the overall differential between large and micro enterprises almost the
same in all four countries.  Zimbabwe stands alone in having a sector with very large
firms, and the earnings differentials increase much more  for the larger enterprises.
The era of decline of wages could have been expected to narrow the differential
in wage levels between the large and small firms since the wage structure is compressed
against a threshold defining either the subsistence or the efficiency level of wages.  The
finding that average earnings, after controlling for the measurable human capital factors,
increased continuously with enterprise size in Ghana, as in other African countries, is an
important one.  Although the size-related wage differential is much more for Zimbabwe,
the extent of the premium enjoyed by workers in the large firms compared to the micro-
enterprises is quite large in the other countries, including Ghana-of  the order of nearly
90 per cent.
4.3  Causes of the Increase in Earnings with Firm Size
The first hypothesis which comes to mind is that the increase in earnings with
firm size is due to  institutional factors affecting the wage  level  . Ghana prescribes
minimum wage levels, and it might be argued that these levels are enforced in larger
firms and not in micro or small firms.  The average  monthly earnings  of workers in the
manufacturing sector at the date of the 1992 RPED survey have been given in Table 3.4
above together with,  the minimum wage level prevailing at this date.
It is  seen that  the minimum wage was more or  less at par  with  the average
earnings in micro enterprises, and as such could be considered to have provided a floor
to the wage level.  It might be argued that wages of the least paid or unskilled worker in
an enterprise would be less than the average earnings.  If this were the case the minimum
wage could conceivably fall between the levels of the bottom wage in micro and small
firms.  On the further assumption that minimum wages are at least enforceable in small
firms, but  difficult to  enforce in micro enterprises, we could at a stretch ascribe the
differential  between  micro  and  small  firms  to  the  minimum  wage  laws.  But  this
explanation leaves untouched the reasons for the continuous increase in earnings, after
controlling for measurable worker quality, with further increases in firm size.
Other possible routes of institutional influence are public sector wage policy and
unionization.  The levels of wages established for public sector enterprises, particularly
in the state owned enterprises could have a disproportionately strong effect on the larger
firms.  But this argument has the same difficulty as the minimum wage hypothesis-it
23explains  a possible  wage  differential  above  a threshold  size,  but not the continuous  non-
linear  increase  of wages  with firm size which  we observe  in the available  data set.
The prevalence  of  the phenomenon  of wages  increasing  with the enterprise  size
in many developing  countries-and  not just in Africa-suggest  there are some basic
factors  underlying  this relationship  in the labor markets  of these countries. The wage-
size relationship  exists in developed  countries as well but it is  quantitatively  much
stronger in developing  countries.  One must, therefore, look for some factors causing
wage levels to increase with enterprise  size which are more pronounced  in developing
rather than  developed  country  labor  markets.
The various issues involved  have been discussed  in detail elsewhere  (Mazumdar
1995). We shall  only summarize  the conclusions  from this discussion  here.
The starting  point of the  explanation  of the observed relationship  clearly  is the
inelasticity  of labor supply to the individual  enterprise. It could be supplemented  with
the consideration of a  group of  factors generally  considered under the rubric of
'efficiency  wage'. It should  become  clear in the course  of the discussion  that 'efficiency
wage' considerations  could be associated  with firm size. A third way wages might
increase  with firm  size is if  labor  productivity, economic  rent and profits  increase  with
firm size and firms  set wages  with profit-sharing  type of considerations.
4.4  Inelastic Supply of Labor
Assume that each enterprise recruits labor from its local pool of labor.  Each
enterprise  in this case faces  an upward  sloping supply  curve  of labor, and the wage  level
would increase with the employment  size of the enterprise. Clearly such a model of
fragmented  labor markets is not realistic without further specification,  especially  in a
developing  country  where wage.  levels in urban manufacturing  are generally  established
at a level  significantly  higher than in the rural sector from which there is a constant
supply  of labor  to the urban  economy.
The hypothesis  that skilled labor  might be in inelastic supply  to manufacturing,
even if there is a plentiful  supply  of unskilled  labor is not sufficient. First, the earnings
function  analysis does control  for observable  human capital attainments  like education,
training and experience. Hence when we hypothesize  that skilled labor commands  a
higher price we are referring  to such factors  affecting  the quality  of labor which are not
measured  in terms of these  observable  attributes. Secondly,  even if superior  labor be
defined in terms of unobserved quality,  why should  not the higher wage  commanded  by
superior labor be equally prevalent in enterprises  of  different  sizes. To establish  the
wage-size relationship we need one or both of two additional hypotheses.: (a) the
proportion of 'superior' labor used in the enterprise increases with the size of the
enterprise.; (b) the enterprise  must produce  its own supply  of  'superior' labor through
on-the-job training in  its internal labor market, and the supply price of such labor
increases  with the volume  of 'superior' labor  needed by the enterprise.
The first of these hypotheses  appears to be weak.  The larger enterprise would
clearly  need a larger voluume  of superior  labor, but the relative weight of such labor in
24determining  the average  wage would depend  on its share in the total labor force in the
enterprise. The suggestion  that this share  increases  with the size of the enterprise  would
appear  to be arbitrary.
The second  hypothesis  based on skill formation  in a firm specific  internal  labor
market has greater plausibility. But to yield the observed wage-size  relationship,  we
need to  postulate that the cost of producing 'superior' labor within the enterprise
increases with the volume of  'superior' labor needed.  This is not an unreasonable
hypothesis  if we believe  that the production  function for 'superior' labor includes  some
relatively  fixed  factor  of production,  specific  to the enterprise,  which  cannot  be increased
at unchanged  cost at the same rate as the total volume of employment. Management  or
supervisory  labor  could indeed  be such a factor of production  of 'superior' labor.
4.5  Efficiency Wage
The  efficiency wage  hypothesis  simply suggests that  a  higher  wage  induces
greater efficiency from the worker. Hence, as long as  the increase in the supply of units
of labor, measured in standard efficiency units, increases proportionately more than the
wage per worker, it would reduce wage costs for the employer if he meets his demand
for labor units by increasing wages rather than hiring extra labor at the going wage rate.
In effect, if this mechanism holds, a profit maximizing employer would. set the wage at
the point where the cost of a  standard efficiency unit of labor is minimized., even if
there is a pool of labor wanting to be employed at a lower wage per worker.  This point
of  a 'wage floor'  is established where the elasticity of the supply of effort with respect
to the wage per worker changes from being more than unity to less than unity.
The  basis for  the postulated  relationship  between wages  and  the  worker's
efficiency has been much discussed in the literature.  They range from better nutrition, to
incentive and morale factors, and to a range of labor market variables like size of good
quality  applicants,  labor turnover  rate,  cost  of  shirking  etc.  The  wage-efficiency
relationship could be observed in  firms of any size group.  But*  it has been maintained
that it would be more important in larger enterprises, that is to say, the minimum wage
cost point would be established at a higher level, the larger the size of the enterprise.
The more important points supporting this hypothesis include:
(i)  The cost of supervision increases with employment  size.  Hence larger firms, at
the margin, would tend to get more of their labor requirements met by increasing
wages rather than by hiring more workers.
(ii)  Larger firms have more expensive machinery  and a higher capital-labor ratio.
Thus the cost of labor turnover for them-in  terms of output loss when a. worker
leaves and a new recruit has to be trained-is  higher than for smaller firms.  Hence
they will be willing to offer a higher wage to reduce the turnover rate.
25(iii)  If the quality  of labor needed increases with the size and value of the capital
equipment, larger enterprises would be offering a higher wage to attract a pool of
applicants in which workers of potential quality are better represented.
In  sum,  while  the  wage-efficiency  relationship  operates  generally  as  an
independent factor influencing wages, it is partly not separable from the enterprise size
effect, in so far as it is stronger in larger firms.
4.6  Increasing Returns to Scale and Profit Sharing
Another route through which enterprise size could affect the level of wages is
through the production side.  Generally firms with higher capital intensity would have
higher value added  (and rent) per worker.  If there is increasing returns to scale then we
would expect to see labor productivity increase with enterprise size even after controlling
for  the  increase  in  capital  intensity.  Such  a  relationship  might  exist  because  of
technological  factors, or imperfections in the markets for products or other  inputs.  In
any event increasing returns to scale provide an opportunity for value added per worker
to increase in such a way that the surplus after payments to factors of production increase
with size.  This surplus is potentially available for sharing between profits and wages-
either through bargaining or a cooperative solution.
In the work of Teal discussed earlier the variable 'profits per worker' does show
up as a significant explanatory variable in the earnings function, along with the 'log  of
enterprise size' and 'unionization'.  Profit sharing thus exists as an independent effect in
the Ghana manufacturing sector.  At the same time production function analysis for a
sample of firms in the sector showed that value added per worker increased strongly with
enterprise  size, even  after  we have  controlled for  the  increase  in  mechanization  as
measured by the capital-labor ratio (Mazumdar 1994).  The increasing returns to scale
which  this  relationship implies  derives both  from  technological and  product market
characteristics.  The quantitative importance of such factors in Ghanaian manufacturing
can be compared with the results from similar analysis undertaken for selected samples
of manufacturing enterprises in other African countries.  They are as follows:
Table 4.3: Elasticity of Value Added per Worker with respect to Capital and Labor
__________  |Kenya  Zambia  Zimbabwe  Cameroon  Ghana
Capital-labor  0.24  0.18  0.31  0.28  0.23
ratio
Employment  0.09  0.19  0.10  0.17  0.05
size
Source: generatedfrom  Mazumdar (1994)
26It is seen that while Ghana is more or less on par with the other African countries
as far as the increase in relative productivity of labor with increase in capital intensity is
concerned, the strength of increasing returns to scale is the lowest in the sample.  This
may be because of the low productivity of State owned enterprises in Ghana which tend
to  be of large size.  A second relevant factor is the relative inefficiency with which
capital stock is used in Ghana's manufacturing sector. The liberalization of the economy
under the ERP was expected to ease the foreign exchange constraint impeding adequate
supply of essential inputs and thus improve the utilization of capacity.  This did happen
to some extent as it pulled up from a low of 18 percent  in 1984. But the level reached in
1992 of 45 percent  is still pretty low by international standards.
The difference in wage levels by size of enterprise in manufacturing is of
relevance to another basic aspect of the labor market in Ghana: the difference in the
levels of earnings between the "informal" and the "formal" sectors. The wage levels in
micro enterprises can be expected to be near the mean earnings of workers - wage
earners as well as the self-employed - in the informal sector, particularly in the urban
economy. But more detailed analysis of the formal-informal earnings differential must
await further work on the GLSS data sets. In the next section we give an overview of  the
informal sector activity and some of its salient features from a cursory look at the data
available.
4.7  Informal Sector Activities in Ghana
The complexity in the definition and measurement of informal sector activity is a
perennial one. Although we do not want to  get into the semantics of this  issue it is
important to recognize that informal sector activities play an important part in the lives
of people in developing countries and Ghana is no exception. 2 Hart (1973) who coined
the term "informal sector" ironically used a study of Accra and Nima in Ghana to show
the  importance  of  such  activities  for  national  income  and  employment  estimates
considerations.  Both from a labor market perspective and also from a living standards
and welfare perspective informal sector activity is important. Some estimates based on
GLSS data indicate that on average in Ghana households earn more than three-fourths of
their income from informal sector activities, i.e. activities which are not covered in our
formal sector earnings discussion hitherto (GSS, 1996). It is stated that in areas such as
rural Savannah almost 90  percent of  household  income comes from  informal  sector
activity compared to  45 percent in  Accra. Alternatively household  activity generated
consumption (subsistence consumption) accounts for around  27 percent  of household
consumption with 56 percent in rural Savannah and 2.6 percent in Accra, indicating the
subsistence nature of informal  sector activity  for Ghanaian households. Estimates of
informal sector incomes and output in Ghana suggest it to be a sizable percentage of
current estimates of GDP. For instance non-farm enterprises are estimated to contribute
at least 20 percent.
2 For some useful  information  on the characterization  and definition  of informal  sector  see Thomas
(1992),  Tumham,  Salome  and Shwarz  (1989)  and Suthuraman  (1981)  among  others.
27However, it must be noted that the above numbers based on GLSS are likely to
be underestimates of the actual size of informal sector, as many activities are small and
fall outside the standards definitions of economic activity and will not  be considered as
important by households and hence not divulged to enumerators during  household or
even  enterprise  surveys.  It  is  an  accepted  fact  that  non-farn  enterprises  always
underreport  profits  as  their  concept  of  profits  mostly  does  not  take  subsistence
consumption into account which tend to  form a  large component of revenue in most
households level activities. In the absence of any other meaningful tracking of informal
sector activity it can be argued that GLSS type household  data can be used to construct
reasonable estimates of informal activities in agricultural and nonagricultural sector.
In  Ghana's  case under household  agricultural activity food  crops predominate
export crops as the main item of consideration in informal sector activities. In certain
agro-climatic regions like, rural forest and rural Savannah a large majority of output and
value  added in crop  production comes from  infornal  activities. In  crops maize  and
cassava are  followed by  grains  and  starches, from  all  of  which  large  proportion is
consumed by households. Cocoa production accounts for a very low proportion of total
household informal activity income. In cases such as livestock production more than two
thirds of income is non-cash and also a large portion is self consumed.
Table4.4:  Source of Household Income by Quintile
Source  First  Second  Third  Fourth  Highest  Ghana
wage  7.2  9.6  12.1  14.0  17.2  13.6
NF self emp income  1.7  0.2  0.5  1.6  1.7  1.3
Formal  8.9  9.9  12.7  15.6  18.9  14.9
wage  4.3  4.0  3.2  2.3  1.5  2.6
Agric income  58.7  56.4  52.6  46.2  44.9  49.4
NF self emp income  19.1  21.9  25.1  26.1  25.5  24.5
Informal  82.1  82.4  80.9  74.6  71.9  - 76.6
Other  9.0  7.8  6.5  9.8  9.2  8.7
All  100  100  100  100  100  100
Source:  GLSS, 1987/88
In non-farm agricultural household enterprises a large share is in urban areas and
two main sectors are trading and manufacturing. The latter was analyzed using RPED
data, while the former is least understood. It is clear that in trading there is low capital
involved and  very  seldom hired  labor utilized,  making  it  a  substantially household
enterprise activity, as opposed to most  manufacturing which compared to  trading has
more capital and more hired labor. Other activities such as transport, construction and
services also employ a large share of non household members, while transport by far has
the highest capital component of any informal sector activity.
Informal sector activities play an important role in the lives of poor people. It can
be  easily  seen  from  the  following  table  that  income  derived  from  informal  sector
28activities declines monotonically with higher levels of welfare. However, it is worth
mentioning that given the complex nature of measuring income accruals from informal
sector activity and different kinds of payment systems in existence in the sector, formal
sector employment and formalized manufacturing sector has mostly been the subject of
analysis  in  earnings  and  employment  literature.  It  is  worth  noting the  fact  that  in
informal sector activities accruals are a mixture of wage and profits and hence can not be
used in more conventional wage earnings analysis that follow in the next section.
5.  Education and Earnings
An important issue in the analysis of  labor markets in  Ghana is the way the
economic decline and subsequent recovery of the economy has impacted the earnings
differences in Ghana with respect to education. The availability of the GLSS data set for
the period when the economic recovery program was just  beginning to have an impact
and more recently for 1991-2 enable us to shed some light on this major topic.
It  should  be  clearly  stated  at  the outset  that  the  variation  of  earnings  with
education levels might be quite different for the three major types of labor which exist-
the self-employed, the wage employees in the private sector, and wage employees in the
public  sector.  Clearly  wage  determination  in  the  public  sector  is  administrative.
Although the significant size of this sector would be a factor in affecting the demand for
labor in the labor market as a whole, private employers would tend to set wages in a
much more competitive way.  As far as the self-employed are concerned, it might be
argued that if the labor market functioned well, their structure of earnings would be the
same as that of the private sector wage earners. But there are two relevant points against
this happening.  First, the observed earnings of the self-employed are only partly returns
to labor-for  many a major part of the income might be returns to entrepreneurship and
capital.  Secondly, in a developing country the many factors segmenting labor markets
drive a wedge  which keeps returns to labor apart in different segments.  In particular, we
have already seen in the last section that wage levels, after controlling for education and
age, vary substantially by the size of  firms in the manufacturing sector, and that the
premium  enjoyed  by  employees  in  large  units  compared  to  micro-enterprises  is
substantial.  Does this  segmentation also  affect the returns to  education in  the wage
employment sector-much  of which is the 'formal'  part of the labor market-compared
to the self-employed representing the 'informal' sector?
Canagarajah and Thomas (1997) provide an over-all picture of the relationship of
earnings to education in the wage employees' market, without distinguishing between
the private  and public sectors. The estimated earnings functions for the two dates--
1987 and 1991-- are reproduced in the two Tables V.  1 and V.2, the first one using
schooling as a continuous variable, the second using various levels as dummy variables.
Both sets of equation reveal a positive and significant effect of education on earnings in
Ghana.  But attention should be drawn to three important points brought out by these
results.
29Table 5.1  Basic Earnings function  by Years of Schooling in Ghana.
Variables  1987  1991
Years of schooling  0.035  0.061
_(7.04)  (13.3)
Age  0.11  0.08
(6.8)  (4.5)
Age-squared  -0.001  -0.007
(-5.2)  (-3.1)
Log hours  worked  -0.24  -0.34
.__________________  (-8.25)  (-7.6)
Female  0.1  l  -0.06
(1.76)  -(1.04)
Other  urban  0.09  -0.27
(1.4)  (-4.4)
Rural  Coastal  0.12  -0.12
(1.2)  (-1.330
Rural  forest  0.07  -0.22
(0.8)  (-3.03)  -
Rural  Savannah  0.16  -0.14
(0.8)  (-1.26)
Constant  2.75  4.9
(8.40)  (10.9)
R-squared  0.24  0.29
Sample  size  765  1021
SoQ  rce: Canagarajah and Thomas (1997)
Table 5.2.  Earnings  function by levels of education  in Ghana
Variables  1987  1991
Below  Primary  -0.07  -0.07
-(0.58)  (-0.57)
Primary  -0.2  -0.02
(-0.09)  (-O. 1)
Middle  0.09  0.42
(0.8)  (5.2)
Secondary  0.27  0.77
. (3.8)  (8.6)
Higher  . 0.87  1.18
(7.4)  (10.8).
Age  0.11  0.09
(7.4)  (5.3)
Age-squared  -0.001  -0.008
(-5.7)  (-3.7)
Log hours  worked  -0.29  -0.31
(-10.4)  (-7.25)
Other  Urban  0.13  -0.27
(1.99)  (-4.3)
Rural  Coastal  0.15  -0.08
(1.5)  (-0.9)
Rural  forest  0.05  -0.19
(0.58)  (-2.5)
Rural  Savannah  0.08  -0.18
(0.8)  (-1.7)
Constant  3.23  4.73
(10.3)  (10.9)
R-squared  0.24  0.27
Sarnple  size  919  1140
Sourc:  Canagarajah and Thomas (2997)
30First, we see from table 5.2 that in both the years the returns to primary education
is not significant.  This is an important part of the educated labor market scene which
will be commented on further below.
Secondly,  the  incremental  coefficients  (showing  the  percentage  increase  in
earnings relative to the previous stage for middle, secondary and higher are .09, .19, and
.60 for 1987 respectively and .40, .35 and .41 for 1991. We see that in  1987 the returns
to post-primary stages show increasing returns to schooling, with large percentage gains
only  occurring at  the  level higher than  secondary.  By  1991 the  labor market  had
changed  to a condition in which all the stages of education beyond the primary offered
equal percentage increase in  earnings.  An important element in  this  change was no
doubt the squeezing of wage differentials particularly in the public sector.  Although the
data in this survey of 1991-2 do not reflect the effect of the across-the-board increase of
civil service wages by 80 per cent, this type of salary hike would not change the picture,
because its impact would be to maintain existing wage differentials in percentage terms.
Thirdly, the schooling coefficients of Table 5.1 show that there was a marked
increase in the rate of return to education between 1987 and 1991. This is a reflection of
the point already noted that at the latter date education at all levels above the primary
were  being  rewarded equally,  not  just  the highest  level.  This  result  might  be  an
indication that the labor market was by 1991 recovering to the point of being sensitive to
the acquisition of human capital.  It is consistent with the result referred to in the last
section  that  education was  in  1991 accounting for  a  greater  share  of  inequality  in
earnings than a few years earlier (see Table 3.4 above).
5.1  Public and Private Sectors
The  results  discussed  so far  do  not  treat  the  public  and  the  private  sectors
separately.  We need to turn our attention to this distinction since, within the class of
wage earners, principles of wage determination could be expected to be quite different in
these two  sectors.  Glewwe (1996) used the 1988-89 GLSS survey to  study earnings
functions separately for the two sectors.  The standard OLS estimates yielded the result
that the coefficient of 'years  of schooling'  were practically identical -- 0.0751 for the
public employees and 0.0738 for private wage earners.  But when selectivity of workers
entering the two sectors were allowed for through two selection equations determining
the choice between wage work and other work, and also between government wage and
private wage employment, there were dramatic changes in the return to education.  Two
alternative methods of estimation yielded the identical result-that  "in the government
sector the returns to education drop to about 4-6 per cent, and in the private sector they
appear to be zero" (p.274).  Commenting on this result Glewwe wrote that it is difficult
to believe that education had no impact on earnings unless one got a government job-
that  there were no return to education in  private wage employment.  Rather, Glewwe
suggests one got this result because the quality of schooling had dropped so much in
Ghana at this date,  that 'years by education' by themselves did not produce significant
earnings increment.  The variation  in the  quality  of  schooling were  probably  more
31important than those in the quantity of schooling.  In the absence of any variable
capturing the quality of schooling  in the earnings function one was left with a non-
significant  coefficient  for the education  variable.
5.2  Quality of Education
It has been  known  for sometime  from detailed  analysis  done in Latin  America
that when school  quality  varies  widely  across  time and space, years  of schooling  may be
a very imperfect  indicator  of human  capital  attained  (Behrman  and Birdsall;  Harbison
and Hamushek). The general  model  which  emerges  from these discussions  is that the
impact  of education  on earnings  is best captured  in a two-equation  system.  The first
equation  traces the deterninants  of earnings  to human  capital  attainment,  not years  of
schooling. The second  equation  attempts  to estimate  the level of human  capital
attainment  as a function  of both quantity  and quality  of schooling. Algebraically  the two
equations  are as follows:
(1) In W = g(Hf E, A) where  W is wage,  H a measure  of human  capital  attained,  E is
experience,  and A individual  ability  unrelated  to H;
(2) H = h (S, Q,  A, B) where S is years  of schooling  (quantity),  Q is quality of
schooling,  A is individual  ability,  and B is family  background.
In this model the impact of schooling on earnings is spelled out as working
indirectly  through  an enhancement  of human capital attained,  along with other factors.
The total effect of schooling  years on earnings can be determined  by combining  the
partial  derivatives  from the two equations:
(3) 8 In W/8dS  = a In W/aH  x  aff/aS
To implement  this model empirically,  we need a measure of H, human capital
attained. Glewwe (1996)  in the work on the 1988-89  survey uses scores of 'cognitive
skills' available in the data set. The survey data contained  the results of three tests of
'cognitive  skills' applied  to a sub-sample  of individuals  in the 9-55 age category. These
covered abstract reasoning  (Raven's Colored Progressive  Matrices), mathematics  and
reading (English)  comprehension.  The last two are used as measures  of H, and the first
as a measure  of A in equation  (1).
Turning  to equation  (2) above,  in the absence  of direct  data which  might measure
school quality, Glewwe tries to control for variation in school quality by specifying
interaction  terms between  years in school and the geographic  region and age variables.
"The former  should control for variation  in school quality across regions and the latter
across  age cohorts"  (p.278).
In his estimation  of equation  (1) Glewwe  finds that in the private sector reading
skills have a significant  impact  on earnings,  while in the public sector  the mathematics
score has a strong positive effect.  Turning to the results of equation (2), "years of
schooling alone is  insignificant, but when interacted with age, Raven's score and
32regional dummy variables, it has a strongly significant quadratic impact on reading and
mathematics scores, the impact being stronger for those with higher school attainment"
(p.380).  These results,  showing the significance of the interaction terms,  reveal that
schooling years work in conjunction with other factors.  The interaction with Raven's
score shows that more talented individuals benefit more from school years-as  judged
by the labor market.  The interaction with age captures the secular decline in the quality
of education.  Persons who attended school many years ago were able to enhance their
earnings per year of schooling more than recent cohorts.  The  result that the regional
dummies, which are insignificant in themselves,  show strong and significant variation in
the attainment of reading and mathematical skills across regions, when interacted with
years  of schooling, point to  the importance of regional  difference in  the quality of
schools.
The total effect of education on earnings were calculated from theses estimated
equations as shown in equation (3).  The rate of return to school years, calculated at the
mean value of both schooling and Raven's  score was higher in the public but no longer
zero in  the private sector.  In the former they ranged between  5.4 percent  and 6.2
percent, and in the latter between 3.4 and 6.3.  As already noted, the rates of return rise
with age are higher in Accra reflecting the higher school quality in the capital city at all
age groups.
5.3  Family  Background,  Private-Public  Choice  and Returns  to Education
Canagarajah and Liang (1996) address a different set of issues in the study of
private-public differences in the returns to education. They consider the labor market all
together, including the self-employed, the private sector employees, and those employed
in  the  public  sector.  We  can estimate  separate  earnings functions  for  these  three
categories, but the resulting estimates might be biased because we are not allowing for
the selectivity factors which govern the allocation of the workers to the t-hree  types of
employment.
The  authors propose. a model in  which parents'  occupational  and educational
backgrounds affect the  individual's  relative employment opportunity  in  the  different
types of job.  The selection equation is a multinomial logit estimate of sectoral choice in
which the explanatory variables are education and age of the individuals, as well as the
parental background factors, and regions of the country.  The equation applied to  the
1991-2 GLSS  data  set  provided  estimates  of  the  expected  sign  for  almost  all  the
variables.  Thus middle school and above education helped job-seekers enter the wage
sector as opposed to self-employment, as did different kinds of diplomas and certificates
from training. Using Accra as a benchmark, residence in  other regions  decreases the
probability  of  entering  the  public  sector,  but  increases  the  probability  of  self-
employment.
Family background had a small but significant effect on the job-seekers'  sectoral
choice.  In  particular  the parents'  white  collar  occupation-clerical,  professional or
managerial-increased  the  probability  of  public  employment.  When  the  earnings
33function was estimated correcting for the selectivity bias, none of the parental variables
were significant in this equation.  What is of more interest for the present discussion is
that the returns to years of schooling were quite different from the uncorrected version of
the earnings function, as follows:
Table 5.3.  Coefficient of 'years of schooling' in earnings equation, 1991-92.
|  Self-employed  Private employee  Public employee
OLS estimate  J  .028  .040  .039
Estimate in equation  .030  .067  .017
with correction  I
Source: Canagarajah and Liang (1996), Tables 6 and 8.  All the coefficients are highly significant.
The important result is that, after correcting for selectivity, the rate of return per
year of schooling is found to be much higher in private employment.  This is consistent
with the changes in wage structure in  Ghana discussed above.  The recovery of the
economy in the few years preceding  1991-2  had  increased the importance of human
capital in the market for wage labor in the private sector. At the same time the squeezing
of wage differentials due to institutional factors in the public sector had, as already noted
earlier,  reduced  the  returns  to  education,  particularly  at  the  higher  levels  (see
Canagarajah and Thomas (1997) and Dar et al, (1997)).
5.4  Trends in Child Labor and Schooling in Ghana
One of the major constraint's in Ghana's growth challenge has been the lack of
human capital development. The enrollment rates have not been picking up fast and the
future trend of human capital does not  look optimistic; in  fact it is claimed the slack
private sector investments in Ghana might be a result of lack of skilled labor and lack of
adequate human capital stock.  The non-school attendance rates in Ghana are very high
with gender disparities. 1992 GLSS data indicate that one in three girls and one in four
boys do not attend school. The rural non-schooling is higher with 37 percent for girls and
28 percent for boys. "Ghana 2000" in its strategy for accelerated growth has argued for
massive investment in primary education as a way of building necessary human capital
for sustainable broad-based growth (World Bank,  1993). It  is therefore  important to
understand the dynamics of household decision making as to whether to send children to
school. and/or work, to benefit from  investments in education. If not, colossal public
investments in education are not likely to get children into class rooms.
It has been shown that poor households in developing countries seldom find it
viable to  send their  children to  school; they are also in  need of cash  income. Hence
parents do not send their children to school and allow them to work. This issue has been
discussed in the context of Ghana by Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) using GLSS
34data. It is estimated  that in 1992 around 28 percent of children  between the ages 7-14
years were involved  in child labor. The data show  that of the total number  of working
children  two-thirds  were also going  to school and 90 percent  were involved  in household
chores. The table below shows  patterns of child labor and school participation  patterns
by various  socio-economic  categories.
Table 5.4: Joint  Labour Force and School Participation Rate (last 7 days), by gender, age, ecological
zones, expenditure  quintiles, socio-economic group and  religion - 1991/92
Work Only  School Only  Work &  None  All
School
Gender
Male  9.2  56.6  20.1  14.1  100.0
Female  9.4  51.0  17.3  22.3  100.0
Age
7  4.7  56.2  7.4  31.7  100.0
8  6.7  59.1  11.4  .22.8  100.0
9  6.1  57.5  17.0  19.4  100.0
10  8.8  55.2  20.2  15.9  100.0
11  8.2  56.3  23.6  11.9  100.0
12  11.5  51.3  22.6  14.6  100.0
13  14.0  46.1  28.3  11.6  100.0
14  16.4  47.1  24.3  12.2  100.0
Expenditure Quintile
Lowest  13.1  46.4  15.5  24.9  100.0
Second  6.8  54.1  21.7  17.3  100.0
Third  10.5  53.8  18.6  17.1  100.0
Fourth  8.7  55.2  19.2  17.0  100.0
Highest  5.7  64.6  19.1  10.6  100.0
Socio-Economic
Group
Public  2.8  71.1  13.5  12.5  100.0
Wage-priv-formal  1.3  75.5  13.9  9.3  100.0
Wage-priv-informal  15.2  52.5  18.2  14.1  100.0
Self-agro-export  9.3  45.2  36.3  9.3  100.0
Self-agro-crop  15.3  35.4  24.7  24.7  100.0
Self-bus  3.4  74.2  9.0  *  13.3  100.0
Non-working  2.2  68.9  0.0  28.9  100.0
Religion
Muslim  12.4  49.7  12.8  25.1  100.0
Catholic  6.1  59.9  21.7  12.2  100.0
Protestant  4.8  62.1  25.6  7.5  100.0
Other Christian  5.5  66.0  19.5  9.1  100.0
Animist  16.6  32.6  16.2  34.6  100.0
All  9.3  53.9  18.8  18.1  100.0
Surce:  Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997).
The  authors  use  a  bivariate  probit model  to  understand the  determinants  of
schooling  and child labor choice simultaneously.  Their analysis clearly shows that the
human capital development  challenge  of Ghana and schooling  decision of households
are not independent  of child labor. The probability of children's labor participation
35declines and school participation increases with higher levels of household welfare.  The
high cost of schooling - both official and unofficial fees  - pushes children into labor
market to enable them to afford school or pulls them away from school as they can not
afford it. The quality of education and its relevance to labor market needs to be given
priority in future education reform to ensure that parents send their children to school.
The current rates of child labor and non-school attendance are not conducive to meet
Ghana's growth challenge for the twenty-first century.
6.  Rural-Urban Earnings Difference
The subject of the last two sections was the nature and determination of labor
earnings in the formal sector of Ghana's labor market.  We now turn to the important
topic of differences in the levels of earnings between the rural and urban labor markets.
In the discussions  of African labor markets this topic has been given the pride of places.
The alleged bias towards the urban economy and the maintenance of labor earnings in
the urban  sector at a relatively high level have been singled out  as one  of the chief
distortions in the functioning of labor markets in Africa-causing  welfare loss both in
terms of equity and efficiency (see, for example the long discussion of the literature in
Jamal and Weeks).
6.1  The Pre-Crisis Economy
Unlike East Africa, Ghana was not distinguished by a  spectacular rural-urban
difference  in  income  or  labor  earnings  before  the  economy  began  its  long  slide
downwards.  An early report comes from  Knight (1972) who presented data from a
national sample survey of household expenditure survey conducted in different regions
of Ghana in  1961-2.  Some selected data from this source are given in Table 4.1.  It is
seen that consumption per household was highest in Accra-about  a third higher than the
hinterland rural areas.  The rural-urban difference was somewhat lower when we look at
smaller towns in the individual administrative regions and compare them with their rural
hinterlands, and non-existent in  the Volta and Western regions.  The average size of
households  was  lower  in  towns  partly  because of  the  greater  proportion  of  single-
member households in town.  Thus the level of urban consumption per capita exceeded
the rural level by as much as one half.  Part of this difference was, of course, accounted
for the difference in the  cost-of-living between town  and  country.  Knight  made an
attempt to estimate the latter using the data from the sample survey, and estimated that
the urban price level was 112 per cent of the rural price level using rural weights, and
104 per cent using urban weights (Knight,  Table  4, p.209). Thus both the extent  of the
nominal  income  difference  in  favor  of  the  urban  sector,  and  of  the  cost-of-living
difference were quite small in Ghana compared to what was prevalent in other parts of
Africa.  In Kenya, for example, the urban-rural differential was as high as 3:1, or even
4:1, and the cost-of-living was estimated to have been 60 per cent higher (Mazumdar
1993).  There were two reasons for this difference.  First, although we have mentioned
that single member households were more important in the urban economy of Ghana, the
36urban labor market was never dominated by circulatory migrants with a high turnover of
labor as in East Africa.  Hence the massive increase in urban wages which took place in
East Africa  in  the  sixties driven by  the  desire to  change the  urban  system  from  a
migratory to a stabilized one was never necessary in Ghana.  Secondly, the urban centers
in Ghana were clearly not so differentiated from the rural ones as in East Africa. But this
relatively modest differential was enough to sustain a significant stream of rural-to-urban
migration through the sixties.  "Between 1956 and 1967 modern sector non-agricultural
employment grew on average by 3.3 per cent per annum whereas urban population grew
at more than  twice this rate" (Knight, p.2 14).
Table 6.1:  Expenditure of Urban and Rural Households 1961-62
Expenditure per  household  Urban  Rural  Urban
(NC per month)  (Rural=
100)
All regions
Consumption of own  2.6  8.5  31
produce
Other expenditure  34.2  19.0  180
Total expenditure  36.8  27.4  134
By region
Accra  46.3
Ashanti  41.3  35.6  116
Brong Ahafo  42.5  30.7  138
Eastern  36.2  31.1  116
Northern  23.4  17.1  137
Volta  33.7  33.3  101
Western  27.9  26.5  105
Expenditure per capita (NC  9.0  6.0  150
per month)
Average size of household  4.08  4.54  90
Percentage of single member  22.3  13.4
households
Sourc:  P.  T.F. Golding, 'An inquiry  into household  expenditure  and consumption  and  sale of household
produce  in Ghana.' Economic  Bulletin  of Ghana,  1962,  No. 4 Tables  6 and 7.
Notes: The data relate to a two-stage  stratified  sample  of 990  households  with income  under  NC  100  per
month
6.2. The Course of Rural-Urban Earnings Differences during the Economic Decline
37The decade spanning the years 1973 to  1983 in Ghana saw one of the most
spectacular  declines  in economic  fortune  that any country  has known. All sectors  of the
economy shrank in real terms.  The output in the cocoa sector declined as producer
prices declined-fueled by both the decline  in world prices, and the domestic  policies  of
the State marketing  Board. The producer  price had reached  a peak in 1956,  but declined
from a level of around 140  to less than  20 in 1983. Because  of the long gestation  period
in the planting  of cocoa trees, cocoa output  did not start its downward  course  until after
1965, but then followed  the price index down. The combined  effect was that the index
of cocoa income in 1983 stood at a level which was one-seventh  of the high point of
1960-61.
Cocoa, however, is only a part of the income of the rural peasants, and is
moreover concentrate  in the South of the country.  How did the food sector behave
during  this period? Tabatabai (1988)  has put together  the record  of eight major crops in
terms of the annual  growth  rates of production,  area and yield. His major conclusion  is
that there was hardly any statistically  significant  trend in yields, but production  shrank
with remarkable  speed-cereals at an annual  rate of  3.4 per cent for cereals,  and of 4.7
per cent for starchy  staples. Evidently  this remarkable  shrinkage  of output was entirely
due to a decline  in acreage.
Tabatabai  ascribes  this decline  in acreage-more pronounced  in the South than  in
the Northern ecological  region-to  the large scale international  migration  of labor to
neighboring  countries  which were experiencing  a mini-boom  triggered  by the oil price
increase. "It has been estimated  that between 1974-5  when the exodus  began, and 1981
some 2 million Ghanaians  had left for Nigeria and Cote-d'Ivoire alone." (Tabatabai,
p.718 quoting UNICEF, 1984, pp.165-66).  Since employment in the "modern" or
formal sector  was maintained  in the period under consideration  (see above),  much of the
emigrant  labor came from the traditional  activities  including  agriculture. "Even if only
half of the reduction concerned  the agricultural  sector, the decline in the agricultural
labor force would  have been of the order of 15-20  per cent between 1975  and the early
eighties." (Tabatabai,  p.721)  While this labor shortage  accounts for a decline in food
production in the decade, it also implies that the decline in the real income of food
producers  was not as much as the output figures might tend to suggest. Not only were
there fewer people  to share in the total output in the farm sector, the natives left behind
enjoyed  substantial  income  augmentation  through  the remittance  of the emigrants.
Relative real incomes of different groups in the urban and rural labor markets
were also changed by sharp relative movements  in different price indices during the
general inflationary  period.  In particular,  although the statistical series are somewhat
incomplete  after 1977, "the conclusion  is inescapable  that the underlying  trend in real
wholesale  prices of food are at most steady, if not actually downward." (Tabatabai,
p.715; see p.714 for more details) The way the divergent movements  in the different
price series affected the relative real incomes of different groups can be seen in the
trends in real returns calculated  by Tabatabai  in which he deflates  the nominal  returns  of
each group by the index of consumer  prices most relevant  to each.  These are portrayed
in  Figure  4.1.
38The course of real earnings of formal sector wage earners, as we have seen,
mirrors the downward trend in the real wage of minimum wage earners, both of whom
are to be found mostly in the urban areas. This is balanced by  the increase in the real
income of traders, many of whom are also found in the urban economy. The basic
reasons for the increase in real earnings of traders over this period  are two-fold:  first,
the deterioration of infrastructure meant that the cost of marketing went up; and
secondly, the shortage of marketed goods-both  imported and domestically produced-
meant that important sources of "rent" opened up for traders. Within the rural sector,
cocoa farmers and the food producers in the South suffered relative to the farmers in the
North.  Because of the mixed nature of the impact of the economic decline on different
Figure 4.1 Trends in real return (1970-85) (1970=100)
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Source:  Tabatabai Figure 3. The data are presented in Tabatabai, Table 9.
groups, it is difficult to be confident about the course of rural-urban income difference
over this period.  But in so far as food producers are the most important part of the rural
economy, and wage earners constitute a sizable section of the urban labor force, it is
likely that  real income per head, on the average, probably had declined in the urban
areas relative to the rural, and indeed could have been lower in the former at the end of
the period.  Official Census data are consistent with this conclusion.  They show that
between  the  two  Censuses  of  1970  and  1984,  urbanization  had  slowed  down
considerably, and the share of the three largest cities in total population had remained
largely the same. (Tabatabai, table 7, p.719).
6.3  The Rural-Urban Differential After the Recovery
39The agricultural sector in Ghana suffered a dual shock in 1983, as the migrants to
Nigeria  were  expelled back into the  country, and  the  country experienced its  worst
drought in history.  "But once the returnees settled down in the rural areas and started
fanning  activities, and  when the rains also  returned in  1984, the situation  improved
considerably.  The index of food output per capita rose from 80.9 in  1983 to  114.6 in
1984,  105.7 in  1985 and  113.7 in  1986 (FAO  Production  Yearbook,  1987, p.47)"
(Tabatabai,  p.720).
With the successful implementation of the ERP the economy turned around in the
years following 1983.  Exports, cocoa output, manufacturing and non-tradable services
all showed significant real growth.  We have detailed information about relative incomes
from the GLSS after 1987.
Table 6.2: Rural-Urban  Differences  in Income,  1987
Accra  Other  Towns  Rural
Household  Income  194.2  212.1  236.7
Income per Earner  165.7  146.8  140.0
Income per capita  62.3  59.2  59.6
Income per AEU  82.6  83.0  84.9
Median
Household Income  122.9  141.4  160.3
Income per Earner  109.9  95.1  92.3
Income per capita  36.9  38.2  38.5
Income per AEU  52.5  56.0  61.1
Source: GLSS 1987
The differences in incomes between urban and rural areas,  as reported in 1987,
are summarized in Table 6.2.  We differentiate between Accra and other urban areas.  It
is seen that income per earner is somewhat higher in other towns and even higher in
Accra,  though  the  extent  of  the  difference  is  almost  certainly  not  sufficient  to
compensate for the cost-of-living difference between town and country.  But even the
nominal difference is reversed when we consider household incomes.  The data show the
perfectly understandable fact that rural households have more earners, because of the
greater opportunity of secondary members (wives, children etc.) to participate in income-
earning  opportunities in  and  around the  farm.  When we  move to the  statistics on
income per capita, the levels of income in nominal terms is almost the same in the three
sectors-showing  the higher burden of dependency of rural households.  This is a fairly
general phenomenon in developing countries, reflecting the greater  incidence of single
member or smaller households in the urban setting.  In fact, because of the limited effect
of  circulatory migrants in  Ghana, the quantitative importance of this  effect  is  much
40smaller in Ghana at this date than what has been observed  in many other countries  (cf.
Kenya,  Mazumdar,  1993).
Table  6.3: Rural  -Urban  Differences  in Expenditure,  1991-92
(Thousand cedis)
Accra  Other  Rural
Towns
Medians
Expenditure  per Eamer  660  620  447
Expenditure  per capita  256  184  144
Expenditure  per AEU  358  276  228
Source  GLSS  1992
Table 6.4: Rural  -Urban  Differences  in Income,  1991-92
(Thousand cedis)
Accra  Other  Rural
Towns
Means
Household  Income  571.4  498.1  462.2
Income  for Earners  520.8  438.3  370.9
Income  per capita.  206.5  143.1  129.5
Income  for AEU  520.8  438.3  370.9
Mediums
Household  Income  388.9  328.3  322.1
Income  for Earner  348  276.9  256.7
Income  per capita  136.2  84.2  81.3
Income  per AEU  186.3  127.2  125.6
Source:  GLSS 1987
Measurement of  income in  terms of  individual welfare can  be refined by
considering  income  per adult equivalent  units (measured  according  to the scales  worked
out by Deaton)  to take account  of varying  proportions  of household  members  of different
ages.  When we compare  this measure among  the three sectors,  the rural areas emerge
with a significantly  higher level of nominal  income  than the other  urban areas, and even
higher  than  Accra. It will be seen  that this pattern  of difference  is noticed  more strongly
when we consider medians rather than the means.  We conclude that in real terms the
average income levels in the rural areas in 1987 were higher, perhaps by as much as 30
per cent compared to Accra, and by a smaller amount relative to other towns.
41We concluded  earlier from  indirect evidence on the  relative  changes in  real
income of different groups that at turning point in the fortunes of the Ghanaian economy
in  1983, rural income  levels were  probably higher than  the  urban.  It  is  seen that
although recovery had improved incomes in both sectors, rural incomes were still higher
after four years of the ERP.
Table 6.4 presents the summary statistics of income levels in 1992 from the GLSS 3.  It
is seen that the situation is changed at this date.  All the indices show much higher
incomes  in urban areas-and  higher in  Accra than in other towns.  The  income per
earner in Accra is a third higher, and income per capita nearly 50 per cent higher than in
rural areas.  This is a finding of major importance, and to see its robustness we compare
the  income  relatives  with  the  statistics  on  expenditures  from  the  same  survey.
Researchers have sometimes maintained that expenditure figures are more reliable than
income data in household surveys as they give a better measure of permanent income.
The indices presented in Table 6.3 corroborate the conclusions from the income relatives
given earlier.
42Table  6.5: Dispersion  of Income  1987-1991





Household  287.430  274.250  354.073
Income
Income  per  82.945  77.588  107.690
capita
Incomeper  113.517  100.035  127.928
.AEU





Household  622.456  633.112  475.932
Income
Income  per  235.581  199.547  172.763
capita
Income  per  266.569  230.138  183.478
AEU
Income  per  575.250  571.772  404.939
Earner
Source: GLSSl and GLSS3
Reference  must be made at this point to the findings in the Extended Poverty
Study of the World Bank. The poverty line in this case was defined as two-thirds  of
mean household  expenditure  per capita in 1988  for the country  as a whole, and expressed
in constant May 1992 Accra prices.  The strong conclusion of this work was that
between 1988  and 1992 "poverty  (as represented  by both the headcount  and poverty-gap
ratios) declined  steeply  between 1988  and 1992  in all areas except  Accra."  (World  Bank
1995,  p.42). This trend is reconcilable  with the evidence  of widening  income differential
between Accra and the rural areas only if the degree  of inequality  in the distribution  of
income increased in Accra relative to the rural areas in the 1987-92  period.  This is
exactly  what the statistics  in Table 6.5 show, if we measure  the degree  of inequality  of
income  by its standard  deviation. Although  income in the capital city grew relatively  to
43the  rural  areas  and  other  towns,  there  were  large  numbers  at  the  bottom  of  the
distribution who fell behind.
6.4  Factors Affecting Rural-Urban Differences in Trends in Income and Poverty
What can we say about these trends in income growth and poverty reduction in
terms of the changes in the relative incomes of different socio-economic groups.  The
following tables indicate the distribution of poverty by urban and rural areas and the
various sources of income by poverty groups. It is clear from Table 6.6 that rural poverty
has declined between 1987-92 although it is still high, while the contribution of urban
poverty to national poverty is on the rise. All of the urban increase has come from the
dramatic  increase in poverty in  Accra. The depth of this  poverty  in Accra has also
dramatically increased by more than three fold. Table 6.7 clearly shows that the poor
obtain an increasingly  large share of their income from non-farm self employment, a
sector which saw substantial growth, resulting in substantial declines in rural poverty.
Table 6.6.: Distribution of Poor by Urban and Rural Areas
Sector  Population  share  Incidence  of  Poverty Depth  of Poverty  Contribution  to
National  Poverty
1987-88.  1991-92  1987-88  1991-92  1987-88  1991-92  1987-88  1991-92
Urban  34.2  33.2  27.4  26.5  8.1  6.8  25.3  27.9
Accra  8.3  8.2  8.5  23.0  1.7  5.6  1.9  6.0
Other urban  25.9  25.0  33.4  27.7  10.1  7.1  23.4  22.0
Rural  65.8  66.8  41.9  33.9  13.8  8.7  74.7  71.9
All  100.0  100.0  36.9  31.5  11.9  8.1  100.0  100.0
ue:  WorldBank 1995a
Table 6.7.: Source of Household Income by Poor and Non-poor
Income From  Poor  Non-Poor
1987-88  1991-92  1987-88  1991-91
Wage  employment  10.0  10.9  19.8  16.8
Farm Self-employment  60.4  52.9  47.3  42.0
Non-farm  Self  emp  19.5  25.7  21.3  30.2
Actual  and  Imputed  rent  2.6  3.2  2.0  2.0
Remittances  6.4  6.5  6.7  7.3
Other  1.1  0.7  2.8  1.8
ource: WorldBank,  1995a
446.4.1  The Absorption of Labor
Table 6.8 gives the statistics of the changing absorption of labor over the period
under consideration.  It will be seen no massive shifts in the pattern of employment took
place.  The share of employment in  self-employed agriculture, after a slight dip between
1987 and 1988, seems to have come back in a strong way, particularly in the rural areas.
There has been some shrinkage in government employment, but the decline in its share is
confined to the rural sector, and perhaps represents the massive reduction of employment
in cocoa boards.  The major change in shares is the decline in private formal (wage)
employment  in urban  areas which  is  balanced by  the increase  in  the  share  of  self-
employed business and non-working.  Evidently the latter two categories harbor a good
deal of low income labor in the urban economy.
Table 6.8: Employment by Urban and Rural Sectors
(figures in percent).
1987  1988  1991
Sector  Rural  Urban  Total  Rural  Urban  Total  Rural  Urban  Total
Government  9.,67  23.87  14.06  10.21  23.77  14.09  8.70  23.49  12.97
Private-formal  2.93  14.15  6.92  4.70  14.04  7.89  2.45  9.10  4.51
Private-  2.43  5.22  3.37  3.03  5.58  3.87  2.71  6.36  3.91
informal
Self-employed  68.71  14.06.  49.24  59.88  11.84  43.57  64.34  11.98  47.0
agriculture
Self-employed  15.92  39.17  21.54  21.93  42.39  28.80  20.41  43.24  27.46
business
Non-working  0.34  3.54  2.14  0.25  2.37  1.74  1.39  5.82  4.13
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  Canagarajah and Thomas (1997); derivedfroom  GLSS 1,2 and 3.
An attempt has been made by the Institute of Social and Economic Research in
Ghana to estimate the size of the employment in the informal sector in Ghana by the
residual measure.  According to this exercise the non-agricultural labor force increased
by 50  percent  between  1980 and  1990, but employment in the formal sector declined
significantly.  The proportion of the labor force which must have been absorbed in the
informal sector (after allowing for registered unemployment) increased from 36 to 45 per
cent of the total labor force (i.e., including both the agricultural and the non-agricultural).
45Over a longer term perspective the ISSER calculation suggested that the proportion went
up from 25 per cent in 1960 to its 1990 level of 45 per cent.
6.4.2  The Formal-Informal Earnings Difference in Urban Ghana
The crucial factor here seems to be the formal-informal earnings divide which
has  already  been analyzed in  Sections 3 and  5 above.  Real wage  recovered  quite
strongly in the public sector after the ERP (and in fact there has been a  further large
increase in July 1992). Mean wages of these workers were above the earnings of private
formal  sector  employees  in  large  firms,  and  considerably  above  those  finding
employment in micro and small enterprises.  The earnings of some of the self-employed
in petty businesses could be as low as and, indeed below the low income of informal
sector wage earners. It is clear that the  self-employed sector must be characterized by a
wide  dispersion  of earnings  and  it  is  this  which  has  contributed  to  the  increased
inequality of income in the urban areas relatively to the rural.
6.4.3  Income Growth and Poverty Reduction in the Rural Economy
The analysis of the GLSS surveys show that poverty measured by the headcount
ratio fell sharply for both cocoa farmers and  food producing farmers between 1987-8
and 1991-2-- from 42.7 percent  to 32.0 percent  for the former and from 42.8 percent  to
37.2 percent  for the latter (World Bank 1995a, Table 3.4,p.28).  The work also suggests
that the poverty reduction is dominated by the growth of income.  Distributional changes
by themselves would have, if anything, increased the poverty ratio in most regions of
rural Ghana  (Jones and Xiao, 1995, Table 2, p.6).  However, it has been noted that this
widespread reduction in poverty ( as measured by the proportions in the distribution of
expenditure below the poverty line) has not been accompanied by matching increase in
agricultural production or producer income.  National  accounts estimates suggest that
agriculture performed below its potential after the initial spurt at the beginning of the
ERP, and has been a constraint on accelerated growth since then (see  table 5.1 World
Bank 1995b, p.39 ).
The slow-down in the  recovery of  cocoa production  is clearly an  effect of  a
downturn in the producer price of cocoa-and  hence accentuates the  deceleration in the
growth of income of cocoa producers.  Alderman (1994) estimated that payments  to
cocoa farmers increased from 5 billion cedis in 1984 to 13 billion in 1987-8 (in constant
prices), but this was a one-time shift largely deriving from the depreciation of the cedi in
the early years of adjustment.  Since then world prices of cocoa have been declining, and
have not been matched any further exchange rate depreciation.
We.  have, however, already noted that cocoa is only a small part of the sources of
agricultural income in Ghana.  For the non-export agricultural sector producer prices are
not  affected by  the exchange  rate, or  by  other aspects of  government  price  policy.
Unlike many other African countries food prices are not subsidized in Ghana.  Supply-
and-demand conditions in the domestic market determine real producer prices-and  in
46any case a good deal of the output of food farmers is non-market. The level of income of
this group varies mostly with the level of production.  However, "uncertainty surrounds
the robustness and reliability of the national accounts estimates of agricultural output of
Ghana.  Government  crop  production  statistics  give  a  more  positive  account  of
agricultural production during the ERP years" (World Bank  1995b, p 40).  Food crop
production, measured in terms of calorie equivalents of starchy and cereal crops seem to
have increased 60 per cent between 1987-9 and  1991-2 (ibid, Figure 3.2).  In sum, the
agricultural production and price data are consistent with  the decline in rural poverty
suggested  by  the  GLSS  data  sets,  but  seem  to  suggest  that  the  latter might  have
exaggerated the decline.
The World Bank Report (1995a) has, however, drawn attention to another source
of income growth and poverty reduction which might hold the key to the clarification of
the factors involved.  The GLSS data show that for the rural households as a whole the
proportion of  income  accruing  from non-farm self-employment  increased  from  14.8
percent  in 1987-8 to 21.5 percent  in 1991-2 (ibid, table 3.3, p.28).  The growth in non-
farm activities during the recovery of the economy-involving  increase both in trade and
non-food commodities-could  indeed have been a powerful source of poverty reduction.
6.4.4  Absolute Levels of Poverty in the Rural and Urban Sectors and Labor
Migration
While the work reported in the Extended Poverty Studies (World bank,  1995b)
show a decline in poverty in the rural areas, and an increase in the capital city, it still
maintains that in  1992 the absolute level of poverty was much higher in the rural areas.
The poverty ratio was reported to be 23.0 percent  in Accra, 27.7 percent  in other urban
areas, and varied from 28.6 percent  to 38.3 percent  in the different rural regions.
Table 6.9:  Net Migration Flows (percent)
(1) Up  to 1970  (2) Up  to 1987  (3) 1982  -1987
REGION  Destination  Origin  Destination  Origin  Destination  Origin
Western  21.1  74.0  39.0
Central  22.4  11.0  6.8
Accra  46.5  15.0  57.6
Eastern  17.0  3.0  27.1
Volta  28.9  31.0  15.3
Ashanti  12.3  13.0  13.6
Northern  31.8  13.0  20.3
& Upper
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
47Sources: Beaudry and Sowa (1994): (1) Ewusi (1984); (2) and (3) Authors'  calculations
from the GLSS.
Evidence from the  pattern of  migration flows cannot really provide firm
conclusions  about the difference  in the incidence  of poverty. The absence  of significant
movement  of labor from the rural to the urban economy  need not necessarily  imply that
the poverty  ratio is no worse in the latter. Migrants  may respond to the expectation  of
employment  a la Harris-Todaro,  or to the expectation  of earnings  growth. Alternatively,
there might be serious impediments  to the movement  of labor due to economic  or social
barriers. On the other hand the existence  of significant  urban-to-rural  migration  would
suggest  that there is prima facie evidence  of higher incomes,  and hence lower incidence
of poverty  in the urban  sector.
We have seen above that rural-urban  migration was an important part of the
economic  landscape  of Ghana  in the years  before  its decline. Beaudrey  and Sowa (1994)
have put together  data on net migration  (i.e. inflow minus  outflow)  for different  regions
and periods. They  are reproduced  in Table 6.9.
Column (1) of the table indicates that prior to  1970 46.5  percent  of  net
migration  was directed  towards Accra. The next two columns  show that the pattern of
migration  was completely  reversed  in the 1980s.  Instead  of being a region of net inflow,
Accra has become  the major source  of migrants. Between  1982  and 1987,  net migration
out of Accra accounted  for almost 60 percent of net outward migration  in Ghana. The
main destination migrants has become the Western region, which is  the region of
expanding  cocoa production.  For some  purposes  information  on the volume and pattern
of gross migration  might be useful.  We produced  tabulations for such migration  as it
took place over the last three years  prior to the surveys  of 1988-89  and 1991-92. These
data are reproduced  in Table  6.10 below.
Table  6.10: Migration  between  Urban  and Rural  areas  in last  three years,
1988-89  and 1990-91
_  1988-89  1990-91
Did not  migrate  78%  90.2%
Migrated  from Rural  areas  5.8%  3.9%
To Accra  0.4  0.2
To Other  Urban  areas  0.9  0.6
To Rural Areas  4.5  3.1
Migrated  from Other  Urban  areas  14.5%  4.8%
To Accra  1.8  0.7
To Other  Urban  areas  3.6  1.6
To Rural Areas  9.2  2.5
Migrated  from Accra  1.7%  1.1%
To Accra  0.5  0.5
To Other  Urban  areas  1.0  0.6
48Source:  Authors' estimates  using  datafor GLSS I and  GLSS3.
While comparisons  between the two surveys are somewhat hampered by the
apparently  more liberal definition of  migration in  1988-89 survey, comparing  the
relative proportions  among  those who did migrate  may still be possible. In both years
there is very little migration  from rural to urban areas-most  migrants  from rural areas
went to other rural areas. What is even more interesting  is that rather more than half of
the migrants  from urban areas went to the rural sector, and only a negligible fraction
went to the capital  city. Ghana  had a remarkable  experience  among  developing  countries
in actually showing  "deurbanization"  in this period. Overall the 1988-89  survey found
that 63.7 percent of the population  was rural, but in the 1991-92  survey  this proportion
had gone up to 65.2 percent.
The recent  evidence  on migration  flows thus shows  that, in the groups  which are
most generally prone to migrate, the income levels in town, in  real terms are not
perceived  to be  higher than in the rural areas. It is consistent  with the finding  that the
incidence of poverty is  increasing and is probably higher in Accra than in  the rural
economy  in 1992.
7.  Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1  The Future of Labor Absorption in Ghana
The slow-down  and, perhaps reversal, in the rural-to-urban  flow of labor is
symptomatic of a basic shortcoming in the economic recovery of Ghana-viz.,  the
inadequate  growth  of the productive  sector  in the non-agricultural  economy.  The rate of
growth of GDP in real terms, although slowing  down a bit in the 1990-95  period, has
still been reasonably adequate at an average of 4.3 per cent. (It had been fully one
percentage  point  higher in the 1985-90  period). But much of this growth  has been  fueled
and led by the services sector.  According  to the National Accounts this sector has
surpassed  agriculture as the major contributor to  GDP-since  1992 its share has
exceeded  46 per cent.  There are several positive aspects to the growth in the services
sector. Government  services  no longer  dominated  the growth  in services,  in spite of the
sharp increase  in wages particularly  in 1992. Growth has been strong because of the
relatively  strong  performance  in the major sub-sectors  like tourism,  communications  and
financial  services. Some part of this growth  can be directly  traced to liberalization  and
the strengthening  of private  banking and other service  activities. It has also been noted
that the restoration  of agricultural  production  to a somewhat  higher level has encouraged
the growth of off-farm trading activities.  However, it is arguable that some of this
increase  in service  sector  incomes  is a once-for-all  adjustment  to the recovery  and cannot
be sustained at this  growth rate without commensurate  growth of  the production
sectors-in  agriculture  as well as in non-agriculture.
In this connection  the recent  experience  of the manufacturing  sector in Ghana is a
matter of concern. The immediate  impact of the ERP was encouraging  as the growth
49rate of output in this sector  rebounded strongly to very high levels.  In the period 1984-
88 the growth rate for the industrial sector as a whole was  11.2 percent  per annum,
while manufacturing per se registered a growth rate of 12.7 percent . But in the period
1989-94 manufacturing faltered to a growth rate of only 2.3 percent . Only the mining
sector continued on a steady growth path.  Evidently, the measures at stabilization and
liberalization have not been sufficient to put the industrial sector on a path of sustained
growth.  The devaluation of the currency did improve the potential competitive position
of this sector, as did the balance of payments constraint on the supply of essential inputs.
But we have seen the real exchange rate has increased in recent years both due to higher
inflationary trends and the inflow of capital, eroding much of the benefits of the initial
devaluation.  As far as the domestic market is concerned constraints exist both on the
demand and .the supply side.  Recovery of incomes has not been sufficient to provide
strong demand  for industrial goods.  On the supply side high cost of credit, outdated
equipment which cannot be replaced because of a lack of adequate internal savings, the
inefficiency of state-run enterprises are some of the basic problems which supplement
the major labor market issue of deficiency of skilled labor in the economy.3
We have noticed above that returns to higher education are quite high in Ghana,
particularly  at  the  university  stage.  But  this  reflects  the  relatively  high  wages  in
government services-which  have been augmented by recent wage hikes. Other studies
have pointed to the serious deficiency of technical and vocational education in Ghana's
education and training system (see Lal et al, 1994 in particular).  The wrong composition
of post-primary education is one of the factors accounting for the low incremental return
to  secondary education noted in  Mazumdar (1994) compared to  some  other African
countries.
Employment trends have mirrored the deficiency of the output growth path in
industry.  Since 1987 every year has recorded an absolute fall in industrial employment.
We have seen that while  employment in the public sector has shrunk to some extent, the
decline in formal private sector employment has been more marked.  The recovery of
real wages in the latter has increased the efficiency-of labor.  Labor productivity has also
increased because of an increase in capital utilization.  But output growth has not been
nearly  sufficient  to  compensate for this  increase,  and  bring  about  a  net increase  in
employment in the formal industrial sector.
The net result has been that the growing labor force which could not be absorbed
productively in agriculture has  spilled over  in  service activities, and  in  the informal
sector generally. The latter contains micro enterprises manufacturing simple products as
well a variety of petty trades and businesses.  Often the distinction between repairs and
new production is blurred in this sector, and so is the demarcation between services and
manufacturing.  The informal sector performs an essential function of job  creation and
increases the welfare of both producers and consumers.  Not only does it use the limited
stock of fixed capital more efficiently by combining it with a larger amount of labor, but
it also economizes the need for working capital by bulk breaking, producing and selling
in small lots and reducing the life span of durable goods.  The marginal product of labor
3 Refer  to Annex  I for a detailed  discussion  on accounting  for growth in Ghana  and a discussion  on the
role of labor  in Ghana's  economic  growth  performence.
50in this sector cannot by any means be considered to be  near zero.  But it has a low
positive value in keeping with the low wages of the labor used in the sector, and the low
income of the customers it serves.  Thus the large informal sector is a symptom of an
economy with a low level of equilibrium income whose potential for growth is weak.
Labor force growth is high in Ghana.  ILO sources estimate that the growth rate
of the labor force which in the 1980s averaged about 2.7 percent  will exceed 3 percent
per annum in the late 1990s (United Nations 1990/91 Part 2).  Very little is known about
the potential for labor absorption in the agricultural sector of Ghana.  It is clear from the
discussion reported above that the large international emigration of labor in the seventies
had led to  a significant fall in agricultural output, and equally the return migration of
labor  in  the  early  eighties  was  easily  absorbed  in  agriculture,  and  was  indeed
accompanied by an increase in output.  Thus over the range of the production function
covered by this degree of change in the labor force, the marginal product of labor is seen
to have had a  distinctly  high positive value.  But it is not known what the value of the
marginal product of labor would be if there is a significant increase in the labor to land
ratio.  The  importance  of  cash  crops,  and  particularly  cocoa  has  declined  in  the
agricultural economy as the international price of cocoa has fallen.  Thus much depends
on the growth of the food sector and the nature of technological progress in it.  An
important consideration in this connection is  that the growth rate of the food sector will
depend a great deal on the extent and composition of public investment.
The development of the  smallholder sector requires improvement in  a  whole
array of factors including limited availability of technological packages, poor delivery of
inputs,  weak  agricultural  services,  limited  availability  of  credit  and  inadequate
infrastructure.  While some of these deficiencies require diversion of effort from weak
public institutions to private providers (e.g., supply of fertilizer and seeds), some cannot
do without active public participation. This is particularly true of extension services and
rural  infrastructure including  road  systems.  Unlike  manufacturing,  where  demand
conditions  and  supply of skilled  labor might  be binding  or additional  constraints to
output apart from investment, agricultural output is likely to be directly responsive to the
level of effective public investment.  In the absence of major shifts to mechanization-
which seems unlikely in the existing technological scenario-emiployment  in agriculture
could be  expected to  increase  with  production.  A  greater  effort  at  increasing  the
investment directed  to  the  agricultural  sector would  seem to  be  the  surest  way  of
increasing the prospects of labor absorption in the medium term. 4
While  something  could be  achieved by  changing  the  composition  of public
investment, the objective would be difficult to meet if over-all investment ratios remain
low.  We have noted in the discussion above that the over-all  investment ratio, after
recovering  sharply in  the eighties  has stagnated  in the  nineties.  What  is more, the
attempt to raise the public investment rate has been at the cost of private investment. In
developed economies, if investment rates are seen to have reached a ceiling below the
4See  Annex 2 for a discussion on alternative growth and poverty scenarios for Ghana for the period 1992-
2000. The results clearly reveal the importance of accelerated agricultural growth for sustainable poverty
reduction.
51level which is considered inadequate for sustainable growth, policy  recommendations
would veer towards  attempts to  reduce  the share  of wages in  the  economy (on  the
assumption that savings propensities of wage earners are lower than those of the other
groups).  But in a developing economy like Ghana's the wage sector is a small part of
the national economy.  Furthermore, it has been argued above that during the period of
the sustained decline of wages in the seventies wages might indeed have fallen below the
wage-efficiency point at which wage  cost per  unit of effort are minimized.  This  is
particularly true in the public sector where the absence of profit-maximizing employers
imply that there is nothing to prevent wages from falling below this threshold.  For both
these reasons wage reduction per se is not the route through which the goal of lifting the
investment rate to a higher plateau has to be pursued.
The recent macro-economic experience of Ghana suggests that the mechanism
through  which  domestic  savings  and  investment  rates  are  reduced,  or  at  any  rate
constrained, is the attempt by the public sector to capture a larger share of the national
income  than  it  can  effectively  command  through  fiscal  measures  of  resource
mobilization. The resulting  inflationary pressure reduces both private and public savings
rates in real terms, and is ultimately self-defeating.  If public savings rates cannot be
raised through the resource mobilization, the only  way to  increase investment in the
agricultural sector is through the changes in the composition of public spending.
It is in this context that the labor market consequences of lifting public sector
wages, particularly the 1992 hike to the tune of 80 per cent has to be considered.  At first
glance  the distortionary  effect  on the allocation  of labor might  be  considered to  be
severe.  We have shown that the average wage in the public sector is significantly higher
than  in  the  private-and  even  higher  than  wages  in  the  large  corporate  firms  in
manufacturing, after controlling for measurable human capital characteristics.  But it was
also noticed that wage levels in the public sector had only just reached the level of 1970
in real terms-and  there had been considerable erosion of real wages in the public sector,
by as much as one-third, in the decade of the sixties.  The long period of decline of real
earnings  of public  sector workers had  by  all accounts resulted  in  severe fall  in  the
efficiency of public services.  It is easy for some people to argue that restoration of the
living standards of civil servants to acceptable levels is a pre-condition of  the creation of
an efficient government apparatus without which necessary public investment of the type
discussed can hardly be successful.  It might be objected that profit maximizing private
entrepreneurs,  particularly  in  the  large  firms  would  recognize  the  lowest  level  of
efficiency wage, and to the extent that public wages are higher, we could conclude that
the  latter  are  too  high  even  from  efficiency  considerations.  This  argument  is  not
completely convincing.  We have seen that the private manufacturing sector has not been
doing too well in terms of capacity utilization and profitability.  It has been subjected to
much uncertainty, not the least of which is the problem created by large and fluctuating
rates of inflation, and hence the real exchange rate. It would be too unrealistic to assume
that private  entrepreneurs would be  able to  recognize and establish  a  stable level of
efficiency wage in this environment.
52A second stance in the distortionary effect of public sector wage policy stresses
the "ripple effect" of high public wages on the wage levels in formal sector private firms.
The detailed analysis of the manufacturing wage structure in Section 4 showed that such
a view of institutional effects on private sector wages is incorrect.  We do not see a two-
tier labor market in which firms above a certain size have a higher plateau than firms
below this size.  Rather there is a continuous increase in wages-net  of measurable skills
- with firm size.  It is thus much more likely that the higher wages observed in small-
medium and large firms compared to micro-enterprises is much more likely to be due to
the  combination  of  economic  factors  discussed  in  the  analysis-a  mixture  of  the
inelasticity of supply of firm-specific skills, efficiency wage and higher productivity and
profit sharing by large mechanized firms.
In our view the more important aspect of public sector wage policy has to do with
the problems of fiscal policy which it poses.  As  long as the public sector wage bill
remains  a  sizable  part  of  government  expenditure  an  increase  in  wage  levels not
compensated by reduction in employment will create strains in the budgetary balance
and  will  defeat  the  most  important  instrument  of  increasing  the  growth  rate  of
employment-viz.  higher levels of public investment in agriculture.  It is possible that a
vicious circle is complete.  Higher wages in the public  sector might  be necessary to
increase efficiency without which productive public investment is not possible.  But if
the government is not willing and/or able to reduce public employment, and is further
unable to  alter the composition of expenditure to provide more finance for agriculture
related  public  investment, a  high  wage  public  policy  will  merely  fuel  inflationary
pressures reducing the real investment ratio even further.  The only way out  of this
vicious  circle,  if  it  exists,  is  a  larger  infusion  of  foreign  and  private  investment,
supplemented by corrective monetary policy, than has been seen so far.
7.2  An Agenda for Future Research
The recent analytical work, including this paper, has set the stage for an in-depth inquiry
into the dynamics of labor markets and poverty and their future prospects. The existing
work clearly shows the need for us to understand the current trends in economic growth
and their implications for employment generation and poverty reduction. We list a few
such issues below for future research:
*  We  should be  able to  use  the GLSS  data  sets to  study  both  the distribution  of
earnings and  the  distribution  of  household  incomes  of  public  sector  employees
relative to other groups and the changes between 1987 and 1991.  It might also be
interesting to simulate the effects of the 1992 wage hike in the public sector on the
distribution of earnings/income for  1991. The GLSS data set might be utilized to
study the difference in earnings between the self-employed and the employees, and
the change in the differential between 1987 and 1992.
*  More detailed work on  earnings inequality in  selected socio-economic groups in
urban and rural areas might be possible utilizing the GLSS for these years.
53*  Analysis  of the  GLSS data  will enable  us to  shed further  light on  the earnings
difference between the formal and the informal sector, and between different types of
the self-employed.
*  A topic  of major importance which  needs to  be  investigated from the price and
household budget data available in the GLSS is the difference in cost-of-living as it
prevails between the different sectors.
*  It is quite clear that the private sector employment has been dismal, but very little is
known of the dynamics of private sector investments and employment opportunities
in Ghana. This is an area which needs further inquiry.
*  We noted that growth in non-farm self employment has resulted  in increases and
diversification of rural incomes, but very little is known of their long term potential
for employment and income generation of specific activities. This will facilitate the
understanding as to what policies will facilitate towards lifting the millions of poor in
rural Ghana.
It is pertinent that we inquire further and understand the internal dynamics of reform,
producer and consumer price behavior and shifts in income sources of rural poor.
3  The informal sector has been absorbing large amounts of labor from both urban and
rural Ghana. It is not clear whether these employment opportunities  are lucrative.
Given the worsening trends of poverty in Accra, it is essential that we understand the
dynamics of this sector in general and those subsectors which are currently providing
employment opportunities to the urban poor.
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56Appendix 1
The Role of Labor in Ghana's Economic  Growth:  An Analysis of GDP Growth
Rates Before  and After  Adjustment
The sectoral composition of Ghana has continued to shift towards service sector,
despite  the  large  share  of  agriculture. Agriculture  accounts  for  45  %  of  GDP  and
employs 55 % of the work force, mainly small landholders, while the employment in the
service sector accounts for over 25 %, whereas it creates 40 % the real GDP. The share
of industrial sector in real GDP and total employment is about 14%. Before 1970, the
country had a relatively high living standards. But because of the poor economic policies
between 1970 and 1982, Ghana suffered from large declines in trade volumes of 30 % in
imports and 50 % in exports. Also domestic savings and investment fell from  12% of
GDP to insignificant levels. Supported by substantial international assistance, Ghana has
been implementing a steady economic rebuilding program, Economic Reform Program
(ERP), since 1983 , including moves toward privatization and relaxation of government
controls. Increase in the production of major export goods such as  gold, timber and
cocoa created a 5 %  overall growth rate  in  1994. The program improved agricultural
income by releasing  the price control for cocoa and the  liberalization of the trading
system for other cash crops. Real food prices (cereals and roots ) have fallen gradually.
One of the major improvements occurred in industry sector especially in mining by an
annual  increase  in value  added  about 9  %  since  1992. Overall,  each  sector had  a
significant jump in their growth rates.
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The paper by Canagarajah and Govindan (1996) assesses the contributions of
each of the major factors explaining Ghana's  real GDP growth; technological change,
increases in the endowments of labor and capital and the changes in domestic output
prices.  The  paper  presents  a  non-parametric  decomposition  of  growth  in  order  to
57distinguish the price and factor productivity without empirical knowledge of the dual
GDP function and examine the relation between the traded and service sectors, together
with their overall effect on growth of the economy. The paper seeks to distinguish the
effect  of  real  price  increase  in  each  sector, the  increase  in  the  stock  of  factor  of
production and productivity improvements.
Table Al:  Sectoral GDP growth rates for Ghana 1965-94
.A.  . .............  ......  a ..... .. ,--.-.  ....
:..  .....  :-Agriculture  Industry  Service
:-  t-9  ......  4.7073  4.6223  -0.5084
....  ..  ....- 0.5278  -4.7334  1.0031
-1-98g34994  ---  2.4959  7.1965  7.5272
The authors divide the Ghana  economy is divided  into 3  sectors: indexed A
(agriculture), N (industry) and S (services), and two factors of production,  indexed L
(labor) and K (capital). Annual data on value added in each sector in current and constant
prices  for  the three  sectors are  obtained  from  BESD  (Bank  Economic  and  Social
Database) tables (World Bank, 1995) for the period 1965-1994. Labor force in millions
of workers which is also obtained from BESD. The wage rates are gathered from Ghana
Central Bank  reports,  Monthly Earning Tables. The  missing values are  interpolated.
Capital stock is calculated from real investment values that are obtained from BESD.
The cost of capital is interest rate. Discount rates, found in IMF data, are used in order to
calculate cost of capital. The share of each of the three sectors in GDP is presented in
Figure 1. It shows that agriculture sector always accounts for the major part of real GDP,
although there is a  decline in  last fifteen years.  The second biggest sector is service
sector and its contribution has been on the  increase since  1977. Industry sector share
which is small compared to the other sectors, is more or less constant over the period.
Table A2: Decomposing factor endowment and price effects, 1971-93
Year  Component  of real GDP  Growth (average  percentage)
I  |  price effect  |  endowment  effect
GDP  Growth  Agriculture  Industry  Service  Labor  Capital  TFP Growth
1971-1975  -0.13  0.92  0.23  -0.41  1.62  2.75  -5.24
1976-1983  -0.85  0.98  -1.44  2.37  1.59  -0.36  -3.99
1971-1983  -0.57  0.95  -0.80  1.30  1.60  0.84  -4.47
1985-1988  5.09  1.77  0.82  -1.79  2.10  0.02  2.18
1989-1993  4.32  0.75  -0.15  -0.62  2.68  0.39  1.26
1985-1993  4.67  1.20  0.28  -1.14  2.42  0.23  1.67
The real GDP growth has been very volatile during the sample period. Although
the country has  a  significant positive growth  rate during the periods  1965-1970 and
581983- 1994, it becomes negative but not so significant during 1971-1982. There is 4.2 %
growth in real terms for the last decade which is commendable.
Figure A2: Total Factor Productivity trends
Total  Factor  Productivity
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The  same  kind  of  fluctuations  are  noticeable  for  the  TFP  (total  factor
productivity). During  1965 -1970 period, the real GDP growth is explained totally by
productivity variable. In the second period, where there  is negative economic growth,
TFP is still positive but very small compared the other periods. But, if we examine the
TFP movements for the overall period, it is very volatile at the beginning and becomes
less volatile and positive later. Since TFP is calculated as residual, this value aggregates
not only the productivity change but also any other factor that can effect the growth rate
but not included to the calculations above. In earlier work attempts have been made to
account for TFP growth through quality of labor, quality of capital and other measures of
factor quality.
The effect of the factors of production are more steady. The employment impact
in GDP growth has been quite big and always positive for the overall sample period. It is
important to distinguish this effect from growth of employment. The calculated nurmber
shows us the contribution of labor growth to GDP growth. Otherwise, the unemployment
problem increased during the sample period. The massive unemployment became one of
the major problems since 1984, when labor has a significant positive effect on growth.
Capital accumulation effect  is always small and negative. But  the magnitude of  this
negative effect is stable over time.
Looking at the domestic price effect, we see that it is rather small. The magnitude
and the sign of the contribution of each sector as price effect are not steady over time.
Agriculture price effect is always positive. For the industry sector, the contribution is
positive between 1985-88 and negative between 1989-93. Whereas service sector as the
non-traded good sector, has a  negative price effect  after  1985, although  it had been
positive between 1971-83.
59These  three  periods  representing  three  different  economic  policy,  are  very
important in economic growth literature for Ghana. During the first period 1965-1970, a
liberal economic policy was followed. Some of the state farms and some industries were
privatized.  The  control  on  prices  was  eliminated.  All  these  policies  created  an
environment where both industry and agriculture sectors grew around 4.5 percent on
average. But the sector price effects of these sectors on the economic growth are negative
during  this  period. The  prices  in  agriculture  and  industry  are determined  in  world
markets. The sector price effects  reflects not  only the growth of the  sector in  local
economy, but also the economic events happening in the world markets. The real price
of cocoa which is the main agricultural product in Ghana, declined significantly during
this period. But the non-tradable service sector  which had a negative growth rate, has a
positive price effect on the real GDP growth. The main disparities between official and
black  market  rate  of  exchange  substantially diminished  incentives  for  foreign labor
migrants. Due to shortage of labor, the cost of labor increased significantly. The service
sector  prices reflected this increase on their own price. Because of the same reason, the
factor effect of labor is not significant during this period at all. Economic fluctuations
and political uncertainty, influenced negatively the real gross investment. Capital is not a
positive factor for economic growth not only  for the first period but  through overall
sample. So, between 1965-1970, TFP captures  nearly all the real GDP growth.
Between  1971-1982, government  changed all  its  liberal economic policy  and
switched to  price  control in  the  market.  Under the  poor  economic  policy,  Ghana's
economic  growth  fell  to  negative numbers.  Agriculture  and  industry  sectors  had  a
negative growth rates where service sector managed to reach 1 percent economic growth.
During this  period, due  to  high  inflation in  the country, farmers  stopped producing
tradable goods and began to produce for family subsistence. This increased the market
price  of  agricultural  products.  This  created  a  substantial  positive  price  effect  of
agriculture although the sector had a negative growth itself.  The industry  sector and
service sector price effects  are negative because of the poor economic situation in the
country. Although all the growth rates are negative, TFP growth is calculated as  4.5
percent.
Since 1983, the government of Ghana has implemented a gradualist but sustained
adjustment strategy under ERP. The reforms successfully turned the economy around.
The real  GDP growth has averaged 4.1 percent.  They undertook several new policy
incentives to increase private sector activity. All sectors has a substantial growth rates,
especially industry and service sector. Service sector becomes the major share in GDP.
Privatization of state industries and increase in exports caused positive price effect of
industry sector. Agriculture has a positive price effect but less than the previous period
because of the fluctuating world price of cocoa and other main agricultural products. The
most interesting part of the calculations  is the negative price  effect of service sector
although this period is the highest growth rate  in the overall period. This can be due to
increase in labor force therefore the labor cost decrease. Labor factor effect is positive
and captures approximately half of the GDP growth. In the capital side, contrary to all
government  support  to  increase  real  investment,  because  of  the  uncertainty  and
60fluctuations, there is no change in the effect of capital stock on growth. The TFP growth
effect reaches its peak point in the last period.
The authors conclude that the labor factor effect is one of the major component of
Ghana's growth together with TFP in the overall period. All other level and rate effects
are fluctuating. Ghana has a labor oriented economy, and it is no surprise that growth
happens to be also labor oriented. The second major effect is total productivity effect
(TFP) which  is  always  positive throughout  the whole  sample. TFP  is  calculated as
residual, so it includes all the effect that are not accounted in this analysis. The high TFP
numbers give the feeling that other factors that are excluded in this calculation might be
important in  explaining  Ghana's  growth  trend.  This  should  be  the  topic  of  future
investigation in understanding Ghana's growth.
61Appendix 2
Growth and Poverty in Ghana: Some Simulation Results
The last poverty profile  for Ghana relates to  1992 and  since then the  economy has
undergone tremedous changes and it is pertinent that we understand the implications of
Ghana's economic growth performence and projections on the future state of poverty and
welfare. Canagarajah and Thomas (1997b) precisely do this using as their starting point
the poverty rates derived using Ghana Living Standards Survey 1992. The headcount is
31.44 percent with a mean per capita expenditure of 215,080 cedis. They present growth-
poverty simulations under four  alternate scenarios based on  1992 poverty figures. The
simulations  are  assumed  to  be  distribution-neutral growth  scenarios  i.e.  per-capita
expenditures  of individuals  in  all  sectors  (agri/Non-agri), location  (rural/urban)  and
locality (Accra, urban and  rural areas) grow at the  same rate.  However, it  is worth
mentioning that if we allow growth to be biased between regions/locations/sectors then
the per-capita expenditure growth rates would be lower, and it would result in an adverse
impact on  the poverty estimates. As  seen  in the  Table  1 below,  the Gini  Index  of
inequality  remains unchanged overtime  in all  the three  scenarios because  growth  is
distribution-neutral. We use per capita GDP, sectoral and private consumption growth
given  by  the  country  economist  in  the  1997  Country  Assistance  Strategy  (CAS)
projections as a  proxy for per capita expenditure/consumption growth in  the poverty
analysis.
Table 1: Ghana: Growth and Poverty Simulations,  1992-2000
Total
Year!  Per-capita  Size of poor
Growth  e-xpenditure Headcount  Depth  Severity  Gini  population
Scenario  ('000 Cedis)  (lo)  (%/)  (%/)  Coefficient  (millions)
Scenario 1: Using per capita GDP growth rates
1992  215  31.44  8.06  2.97  0.338  4.96
1995  226  28.03  6.97  2.49  0.338  4.81
2000  248  22.62  5.15  1.75  0.338  4.49
Scenario 2: Using per capita private consumption growth rates
1992  215  31.44  8.06  2.97  0.338  4.96
1995  216  30.92  7.91  2.90  0.338  5.31
2000  235  25.81  6.21  2.18  0.338  5.13
Source:  GLSS 3, Ghana CAS (1997) Annex A5, and World Bank staff estimates.
Scenario 1: Real per capita GDP is assumed to grow according to the optimistic World
Bank (CAS) projections. As  a result, per  capita expenditure grows  at a rate  of  1.80
percent  p.a. between 1992-2000. In this case, the headcount measure will decline from
31.4 percent  in 1992 to 22.62 percent  in 2000. However, the size of the poor population
will decrease from 4.96 million in 1992 to 4.49 million in year 2000.
Scenario 2: Real per-capita private consumption is assumed to grow according to the
CAS projections. As a result, per capita expenditure grows at a rate of 1.12 percent  p.a.
62between 1992-2000. In this case, the headcount measure will decline from 31.4 percent
in  1992 to  25.8 percent  in 2000, and the size of the poor population  will decrease
slightly from 4.96 million in 1995 to 5.13 million in year 2000.
Both of these projections clearly show that despite the large decline in the headcount
measure  of  poverty  (P0), there  is  not  a  significant decline  in  the  size of  the poor
population;  In  fact  using  the  private  consumption  growth  rates  the  size  of  poor
population would increased from 4.9 in 1992 to 5.13 million in year 2000.
As a second set of scenarios we used the sectoral growth rates (agriculture, industry and
services) instead of the overall GDP growth rates. The sectoral growth rates are applied
to  households  on  the  basis  of  the  sectoral-employment  status  of  the  head  of  the
household (derived from the GLSS 3 household surveys). For our simulations, we used
the actual sectoral growth rates for the three sectors as given in the CAS projections
(Annex Cl).  In the first scenario we used the overall population  growth rate of  3.0
percent , while in the second scenario we used an urban population growth rate of 4.2
percent  p.a. and a rural population growth of 2.4 percent  p.a. (These data are obtained
from  Live Data Base (LDB) and  give the  same overall population  growth rate of  3
percent  p.a.). The results are shown in Table 2 below:
Table 2: Ghana: Growth and Poverty Simulations, 1992-2000
Total
Year!  Per-capita  Size of poor
Growth  expenditure  Headcou  Depth  Severity  Gini  population
Scenario  ('000 Cedis)  nt  (%/)  (%)  Coefficie  (millions)
(°/)  nt
Scenario 3: Different sectoral growth rates; population growth rate=3.0% p.a.
1992  215  31.44  8.06  2.97  0.338  4.96
1995  222  29.65  7.61  2.78  0.341  5.11
2000  240  26.42  6.57  2.35  0.349  5.28
Scenario  4:  Different  sectoral  growth  rates;  population  growth  rate,
urban=4.2% rural=2.4%
1992  215  31.44  8.06  2.97  0.338  4.96
1995  222  29.42  7.52  2.74  0.341  5.07
2000  240  25.93  6.36  2.26  0.346  5.20
Source:  GLSS 3, Ghana CAS (1997) Annex C1 and World Bank staff estimates.
Scenario 3: Real GDP is assumed to grow differently in the three sectors according to
the sectoral growth projctions contained in the CAS. Overall population is assumed to
grow at 3.0 percent  p.a.,  as a result, per capita expenditure grows at a rate of  1.38
percent  p.a. In this case the headcount measure will decline from 31.4 percent  in 1992
to 26.42 percent  in 2000. However, the size of the poor population will increase from
4.96 million in 1992 to 5.28 million in 2000. Since different sectoral growth rates were
assumed  this  scenario  shows  the  adverse  impact  on  income  distribution  through
worsening Gini coefficient.
63Scenario 4: Real GDP is assumed to grow differently in the three sectors according to
the  CAS  projections.  Urban  population  grows  at  4.2  percent  p.a.  while  the  rural
population grows at 2.4 percent. As a result, the overall per capita expenditure grows at
around  1.38 percent  p.a. In this case the Headcount measure will decline from  31.4
percent  in  1992 to 25.9 percent  in 2000. However, the size of the poor population will
increase from 4.96 million in  1992 to 5.20 million in 2000. Like the previous scenario,
the different sectoral growth rates assumed in this scenario shows the adverse impact on
income distribution through worsening Gini coefficient.
Figure Al:  Number of Poor in Ghana under alternative scenarios: 1992-2000
Poverty in Ghana 1992-2000
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These simulations show that the low average growth rate in agriculture is not enough to
make a dent on poverty. The figure above shows that the four simulations do not make a
significant difference in the number of poor people in Ghana; the number of poor will
remain around 5 million. Even though the headcount measure of poverty will decline
during this period, the incidence of poverty among the people engaged in agriculture will
remain almost unchanged, while there is significant decrease in the incidence of poverty
in all other socio-economic groups (Table 3). However, the size of the poor population
will increase mainly due to the increase in population. The different sectoral growth rates
assumed  in  scenarios  3  and  4  clearly  show  that  income  distribution  is  likely  to
deteriorate. All these indicate that agriculture growth is fundamental to have a significant
decline in poverty, because (i) agriculture has a much larger share in the total GDP (45
percent)  than industry  or  services sector,  and  (ii) most  of  the  poor  are engaged  in
agriculture activities. Until significant gains are made by the majority of the poor in rural
agrarian sector it is hard to imagine a measurable impact of poverty reduction in Ghana.
64Table 3:  Poverty  by Socio-Economic groups, using the sectoral growth  rates.
Socio-economic  Headcount  Index
Group  1992  1995  2000
Public-formal  21.72  19.42  15.11
Private-fornal  16.44  15.56  12.80
Private-inforrmal  27.97  22.83  20.10
Self-emp-Agriculture  38.82  38.63  36.87
Self-emp-Industry  26.55  22.48  17.51
Locality
Accra  22.97  19.83  14.71
Other Urban  27.70  24.65  19.75
Rural  33.89  32.72  30.34
Ghana  31.45  29.65  26.42
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